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PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA:
THE MISUNDERSTOOD SUMMARY JUDGMENT
REVOLUTION
Luke Meier*
This article offers a reinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corporation. Although Matsushita is often credited with
ushering in a new era of summary judgment by shifting power from
the jury to trial court judges, this conclusion is based on an
erroneous understanding of the case. In reality, Matsushita is a
narrow decision that does not alter the relationship between judge
and jury. Appreciating the true import of Matsushita is possible
only by delineating between the concepts of probability and
confidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita is usually
understood as having been decided according to a probability
analysis, but the best interpretation of the case is that it was
decided pursuant to a confidence analysis. Recognizing the true
basis of the Matsushita decision dispels the popular belief that
Matsushita requires an aggressive use of summary judgment by
trial judges. In addition, properly understanding Matsushita is the
key to comprehending the pleading requirement of “plausibility,”
which the Supreme Court introduced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.

* Associate Professor of Law, Baylor Law School. J.D., University of Texas
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Wittlin, Jim Wren, Richard Wright. I am also grateful for the research help
provided by the following individuals: Ryan Jamison, Erin Hamilton, Emily
Oglesby, Andrea Palmer, and Kim Pearson. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

In my article Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury
Standard,1 I explore the difference between the concepts of
probability and confidence as they pertain to disputed questions of
fact in litigation. Stated simply, the concept of probability requires
an estimate as to the likelihood of a given fact being true; the
confidence inquiry asks how sure one is in the accuracy of that
probability estimate. Generally speaking, the more evidence one
has regarding an unknown fact the more confident one can be in a
probability estimate of that given fact. In the Reasonable Jury
article, I explain that a judge can use either a probability analysis
or a confidence analysis to dispose of a suit through summary
judgment. I also explain why the legal profession has, for the most
part, failed to distinguish between these separate theories of
summary judgment. I conclude that this failure can be primarily
attributed to the Supreme Court’s gloss on the language of Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This judicial gloss—the
reasonable jury standard2—obscures the distinction between
confidence and probability at the summary judgment stage.3
This article builds on the foundation established in the
Reasonable Jury article by demonstrating the importance of
separating the concepts of probability and confidence. More
specifically, this article will focus on the incorrect—and
unfortunate—interpretation assigned to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in the infamous antitrust case of Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation.4
The Matsushita decision is one of the Supreme Court’s most
frequently cited cases.5 Along with the other 1986 “trilogy”
cases—Anderson v. Liberty Lobby6 and Celotox Corp. v.
1

Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence and the Reasonable Jury Standard,
84 M ISS . L.J. (2015) (forthcoming).
2
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
3
See id. at 255–56; see also Meier, supra note 1.
4
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
5
See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1357 (2010) (listing Matsushita as the third-most cited Supreme Court case by
federal courts and tribunals).
6
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242.
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Catrett7—the Matsushita opinion is often credited for ushering in a
new era of summary judgment. 8 In this new era, trial court judges
are to aggressively “screen” cases to prevent “unworthy” cases
from proceeding to the jury for a full-blown trial.9 The Matsushita
opinion, in particular, is thought to support this modern approach
to summary judgment.10 In Matsushita, the Supreme Court upheld
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant despite a vigorous dispute by the plaintiffs and
defendants regarding the material facts of the litigation.11 Thus,
more so than the Anderson and Celotex cases—which both rested
7

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary
Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 517, 517 (2012) (“Conventional wisdom long
held that the Trilogy caused a fundamental shift in pretrial practice by leading
lawyers to be more aggressive in seeking summary judgment and by leading
judges to be more willing to grant it.”); Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal
Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE WEST. L. REV. 453, 455 (2010) (stating that
this trilogy of Supreme Court cases “invigorated summary judgment practice”);
William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1695, 1712 (2001) (“The Supreme Court’s invigoration of federal
summary judgment practice occurred in the 1985 term when the Court decided a
trilogy of cases . . . .”).
9
See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987, 994 (2003) (“In a series of cases in 1986, the Supreme Court sent a
clear signal to the lower courts that summary judgment could be relied upon to
weed out frivolous lawsuits and avoid wasteful trials.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1897, 1913 (1998) (concluding that the trilogy cases “promoted summary
judgment from a housekeeping device for picking up obviously unworthy cases
to a major option to be encouraged, or even pushed, in all kinds of disputes,
large and small, even in some involving factual controversies”).
10
See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary
Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1568 (1995) (stating that Matsushita
is a “major landmark in summary judgment jurisprudence” despite efforts by
commentators to limit the case); but see Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment
and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1329, 1348 (2005) (“Celotex most clearly altered well-established summary
judgment practice, and in any event, Celotex, far more than the others [in the
trilogy], decisively opened the eyes of the federal courts to the propriety of
summary judgment in certain cases . . . .”).
11
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
595–98.
8

PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA

73

on technical legal questions12—Matsushita has been cited as the
lynchpin13 of the modern trend in which summary judgment is
used more aggressively by the trial court judge to take issues away
from the jury.14 Pursuant to this understanding of the case, the
12

See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[W]e find no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits
or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”); Adam Steinman,
The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens
Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 94 (2006)
(“Anderson raised the narrow issue of the property approach to summary
judgment motions when the dispositive issue is subject to a heighted standard of
proof.”).
13
See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick
Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 510 (2009) (“Matsushita . . . created a
modern and dynamic summary judgment mechanism.”). Because of the
profound effect on summary judgment that Matsushita has had, it is still studied
and debated in a way that Anderson and Celotex are not. See, e.g., Spencer
Waller Weber, Matsushita at Twenty: A Conference Introduction, 38 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 399, 399–400 (2007) (explaining why the Matsushita case was
selected as a symposium topic).
14
See, e.g., Joe Sims & Philip A. Proger, Litigation Issues in Dealer
Termination Pricing Cases, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 466 (1991) (“Matsushita
seem[s] to encourage courts to use summary judgment more aggressively . . .
where the prevailing view had been that summary judgment should be used
sparingly given the inherently circumstantial nature of much of the proof.”).
Although all commentators agree that federal jury trials are vanishing, they
disagree as to whether the “modern” approach to summary judgment, as shaped
by the 1986 trilogy, is responsible for this trend. Compare Martin H. Redish,
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1332–35 (2005) (discussing the empirical
studies documenting the decrease in federal civil jury trials and concluding that
“common sense” suggests that the Court’s decision in Matsushita (as well as
Celotex and Anderson) is at least partly responsible for this trend), with Linda S.
Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado
About Very Little, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 561 (2012) (remarking that “numerous
empirical studies have shown [that] the summary judgment trilogy has had scant
impact on judicial reception to enhanced utilization of summary judgment as a
means to streamline litigation”). I consider myself as an adherent of the
“common sense” view urged by Professor Redish; even if it is difficult to
empirically demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between the 1986
trilogy cases and the subsequent decline in jury trials, this does not mean that no
such relationship exists. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment:
What We Think We Know Verses What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita signaled to lower court
judges: Avoid the costs and expense of trial if the evidentiary
record leans towards one party’s version of the material facts in
dispute.15
But there has always been some uneasiness regarding this
conventional understanding, and use, of Matsushita. Some
commentators and courts have insisted that Matsushita was a
unique case that should be limited to the antitrust context.16 There
is ample support within the Matsushita opinion for this view;
various portions of the opinion reference factors unique to antitrust

705, 719 (2012) (“[T]hese numbers do not tell us how many potential plaintiffs
chose not to file their claims because of the chilling effect of the trilogy and
increased use of summary judgment.”).
15
See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution:
A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary
Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 42 (1988) (quoting a federal judge, in open
court on a motion for summary judgment, as saying that “the Supreme Court has
told us [in the trilogy cases] to make wider use of summary judgment to
eliminate cases”).
16
See, e.g., In re Dana Corp, 574 F.3d 129, 158 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that
it had “considerable difficulty with the bankruptcy court’s [] reliance on
Matsushita” because the case before the court did not involve antitrust
litigation); White v. Cmty Care, Inc., No. CIV.A.07-1507, 2008 WL 5216569, at
*15 n.16 (W.D. Pa. 2008 Dec. 11, 2008) (saying that Matsushita was “factually
distinguishable” from the civil rights case before the court); Edward Brunet,
Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV.
493, 510–11 (2009) (acknowledging that there were transsubstantive portions of
the Matsushita opinion, such as the rejection of the former “slightest doubt”
interpretation of Rule 56 in favor of the reasonable jury standard used for
directed verdicts, but also explaining that the portion of the opinion in which the
Court considered whether the plaintiffs’ evidence was plausible “only makes
sense if characterized as a matter of substantive antitrust law”); Arthur R. Miller,
The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044–68 (2003) (concluding that
Matsushita “seems specific to the antitrust context”); William W. Schwarzer &
Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6–
7 (1993) (concluding that Matsushita “rests on a specific point of antitrust law”);
Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 628 (2003) (“Matsushita may be an artifact of
antitrust law . . . .”).
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law.17 This more limited view of Matsushita, however, undermines
the broad principles the case is used to support. If the Matsushita
decision was the result of factors unique to the antitrust context,
the case cannot justify the broader, seismic shifts that have
occurred within summary judgment law in the past twenty-five
years.
In addition, viewing Matsushita as a unique product of antitrust
law seems inconsistent with the transsubstantive nature of Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is beyond dispute that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted with the view
that the principles and approaches contained therein could be
applied even-handedly to cases involving all different types of
substantive law.18 If Matsushita was truly the byproduct of the
antitrust setting of the case, there has yet to be a credible
explanation as to how this conclusion is consistent with the
transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules.
Thus, a stalemate has developed regarding the appropriate
understanding of Matsushita. Many commentators and lower
courts continue to cite Matsushita outside of the antitrust context.19
Under this view, Matsushita is an extremely important case
because it requires a reorientation of the respective roles of trial
court judge and jury regarding the resolution of facts. The
transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules, including Rule 56,
supports this understanding of Matsushita. In addition, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent characterization of Matsushita as not
“introduc[ing] a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary

17

See infra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:
An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
377, 383 (2010) (“It was almost inevitable that the Advisory Committee would
draft transsubstantive rules . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., Smith v. Boyer, 2012 WL 2116502, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jun 11,
2012) (citing Matsushita in a civil rights case); United States v. Degayner, 2008
WL 4613084 (M.D. Fla. Oct 16, 2008) (citing Matsushita in a False Claims Act
case); Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 261, 338 (2010) (“[Matsushita] is frequently taught in civil procedure
classes as a summary judgment case, not an antitrust case.”); Miller, supra note
16, at 1068–69 nn.456–63 (listing older cases applying Matsushita outside of the
antitrust context).
18
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judgment in antitrust cases”20 arguably lends support to the view
that Matsushita is a broadly applicable opinion whose import is not
limited to the antitrust context. Other commentators and courts
continue to insist, however, that Matsushita was a product of
forces unique to the antitrust context;21 the language of the
Matsushita opinion strongly supports this view.
The stalemate that has developed has not been resolved
because the proponents of each of these differing views have failed
to adequately address fundamental problems regarding their
respective positions. Thus, those who broadly interpret Matsushita
as changing the respective roles of judge and jury have failed to
explain the portions of the opinion that emphasize the case’s
antitrust context.22 On the other hand, those who view Matsushita
as unique to antitrust law have failed to reconcile the Court’s
emphasis on antitrust-unique factors with the transsubstantive
nature of the Federal Rules.23
This stalemate will continue so long as Matsushita is
understood as having been decided pursuant to a probability
analysis. According to the current, conventional wisdom regarding
Matsushita, the Court’s decision to affirm summary judgment for
the defendants revolved around the question as to whether the
defendants had, in fact, engaged in the illegal agreement alleged by
the plaintiffs.24 This conventional wisdom regarding Matsushita

20

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992).
Risinger, supra note 15, at 42.
22
See, e.g., Duane, supra note 10, at 1554–95 (proposing a broad
interpretation of Matsushita but never accounting for the antitrust-specific
language in the opinion).
23
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 16, at 1029–34 (concluding that the antitrust
context of Matsushita was important to the Court’s conclusion but not
reconciling this view with the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
24
See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island:
Is It Time to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 153,
170 (1997) (“[Matsushita] gave to federal trial judges the authority, if not the
mandate, to review even the most complex evidence and then make a
determination as to whether the evidence could support reasonable inferences by
a fact finder regarding the material prongs of the burden imposed by the
substantive law on the party seeking to have the favorable inferences drawn.”).
21
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finds support in various portions of the Court’s opinion.25
This stalemate will not be resolved as long as the case
continues to be understood from a probability perspective. If,
however, Matsushita is viewed according to a confidence analysis,
the internal inconsistencies that arise under the probability
understanding of the case are resolved. Under a confidence reading
of Matsushita, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on
whether the illegal antitrust agreement the plaintiffs alleged had, in
fact, occurred. Instead, what the Court decided was that there was
so little evidence on this point that any conclusion as to the
probability of the existence of the agreement would necessarily
involve an unacceptable margin of error, thus requiring that
summary judgment be entered against the plaintiff. Under a
confidence analysis, a court determines the acceptable “margin of
error” or level of confidence that will be required in a particular
case.26 This purely legal analysis compels a court to consider the
consequences of allowing a jury to make a probability
determination on a scant record. This analysis can be informed by
factors unique to the substantive law involved in a particular
dispute.
Thus, if Matsushita was decided according to a confidence
analysis, the Court quite sensibly considered that an erroneous
conclusion regarding the factual dispute in Matsushita could result
in debilitating consequences for businesses engaged in perfectly
legal—and economically desirable—conduct. Under this view,
because of the particular antitrust costs associated with an
erroneous factual conclusion, the Court in Matsushita required
additional evidence before the case could reach the jury. By
requiring that more evidence be assembled before the case is
submitted to a jury, the margin of error associated with any jury
conclusion decreases and a sufficient degree of confidence can be
had in the conclusion actually reached by the jury.
A confidence interpretation of Matsushita can thus explain why
the Court’s opinion emphasized factors unique to antitrust law.
Moreover, if Matsushita was decided according to a confidence
analysis, the Court’s reliance on factors unique to antitrust law is
25
26

See infra notes 111–21 and accompanying text.
See Meier, supra note 1.
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fully consonant with the transsubstantive approach of the Federal
Rules. A confidence analysis is transsubstantive in the sense that a
trial judge must always be satisfied that there is a sufficient amount
of evidence in the case to satisfy the confidence threshold. That
said, the application of this transsubstantive standard may require a
judge setting this confidence threshold to consider the subject
matter of the litigation. In this sense, a confidence analysis is
similar to the pleading standard set out in Federal Rule 8. Both
standards are transsubstantive, but applying them in a particular
case requires consideration of the substantive law at stake.
A confidence understanding of Matsushita can thus resolve the
current stalemate regarding this infamous case by explaining the
Court’s antitrust-specific language in a way that is consistent with
the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. The Matsushita
opinion, carefully considered with a little bit of effort, supports the
view that the Court’s decision was actually based on a confidence
inquiry (“Is there a sufficient amount of evidence in the record to
permit the case to proceed to the jury for a probability analysis?”)
rather than a probability inquiry (“Does the record evidence
support the conclusion that an illegal conspiracy did, in fact,
occur?”). Given that the language of Matsushita is consistent with
a confidence analysis, and considering that this reading of the case
resolves the current stalemate regarding the appropriate
interpretation of that case, the confidence reading of Matsushita is
the superior interpretation.
Resolving the true meaning of Matsushita, over twenty-five
years after the case was decided, is not simply an academic
exercise. The Matsushita opinion is still used as the basis for the
modern, zealous use of summary judgment that has eroded the role
of the jury and warped the distinction between law and fact.27 This
view, based on a misunderstanding of Matsushita, should be
rejected. Properly understood, Matsushita is actually a narrow case
with relatively little importance outside of the antitrust context.
In addition, a correct interpretation of Matsushita is the key to
understanding the “plausibility” pleading standard that the
27

See, e,g., Superior Offshore Int’l., Inc. v. Bristow Grp., Inc., No. 1130102012 WL 3055849, at *3 (3d Cir. July 22, 2012) (citing Matsushita and
stating that a court “need not turn a blind eye to the weight of the evidence”).
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Supreme Court recently introduced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.28
In Twombly, the Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff’s
complaint must assert a claim that is “plausible” to the district
court judge.29 Most commentators have interpreted the
“plausibility” standard to require an analysis of the probable truth
of the plaintiff’s allegations.30 If the Matsushita defendant was
entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff did not have
enough evidence, it is relatively easy to see why the Court believed
that the Twombly defendant was entitled to a dismissal at the
pleadings stage: even if everything alleged in the Twombly
complaint was true, this circumstantial evidence would not
constitute a sufficient amount of evidence to enable the plaintiff to
get to a jury. Thus, Twombly—like Matsushita—did not involve an
invasion into the fact-finding terrain of the jury. Most
commentators interpret Twombly in this light,31 and have rightly
criticized the notion that a trial court judge should determine the
28

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See id. at 556–57.
30
See, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal
Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56
VILL. L. REV. 857, 859 (2012) (stating that the plausibility standard “requires a
district court to refer to objective information, albeit extraneous to the
complaint, to inform itself of the “truth” of the factual picture painted by the
plaintiff in the complaint.”); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility of
Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (2011) (“The Court’s use of the term
“possibility,” however, belies the assertion that plausibility is not a probability
analysis because possibility is an expression of probability.”); Suzette
Malveaux, Front Loading And Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 65, 83–84, 85 (2010) (concluding that the plausibility test
requires a probability analysis); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
26 (2010) (stating that the plausibility analysis depends “on the relative
likelihood that legally actionable conduct occurred versus a hypothesized
innocent explanation.”); Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo,
Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(A)(2)
Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges With the Heightened Pleading
Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV. OF LITIG. 1, 26 (2010)
(describing Twombly’s plausibility standard as a “tacit probability”
requirement).
31
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
29
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inferential value of circumstantial evidence, a function historically
reserved to the jury.32 Instead, Twombly and Matsushita—properly
interpreted—simply involved instances in which the court
concluded, as a matter of law, that either the record evidence or the
factual allegations, even if proven true, would not constitute an
adequate amount of information from which the jury could resolve
the disputed question of fact.
This article will slowly build toward the conclusion that
Matsushita has been incorrectly interpreted as a case involving
probability rather than confidence. In Section II, I will begin by
quickly examining the infamous blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals first posed by Professors Laurence Tribe and
Jonathon Cohen, respectively. Each of these hypotheticals presents
a similar paradox: How can a district court judge resolve a case in
favor of a defendant, before a jury trial, when the scant evidence
available suggests that the plaintiff’s version of a disputed,
material fact to the litigation is—more likely than not—true? This
“paradox” can only be resolved by carefully distinguishing
between the concepts of confidence and probability. As such, the
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals serve as an excellent
starting point for identifying and distinguishing between the
concepts of confidence and probability in the litigation context.
This section will briefly introduce the concepts of probability and
confidence and demonstrate how the “paradox” of the blue bus and
gatecrasher hypotheticals can only be resolved with an
appreciation for how these two concepts are distinct.
Section III of this Article segues from the hypothetical,
controlled context of the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals to
the actual cases discussed in Sections IV and V. To facilitate this
32

See Bahadur, supra note 30, at 456 (“If plausibility were akin to a
probability requirement, plausibility would be abhorrent to the constitutionally
based division of labor in the federal court system because the judge, rather than
the jury, would be answering the question of whether or not the allegations in
the complaint are more likely accurate than not.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal
and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005–06 (2010) (“It is unsurprising that
Iqbal and Twombly both strenuously deny that they impose a ‘probability’
requirement at the pleading stage. Probability—at least in the civil context—is
typically understood as the province of the jury. Probability pleading would
have been a true sea change in the division between judge and jury.”).
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transition, I will dispel the notion that the confidence principle is
only important to litigation involving the type of overt statistical
evidence such as that involved in the blue bus and gatecrashers
hypotheticals. In reality, the confidence principle can be triggered
even when the scant record evidence does not involve the type of
overt statistical evidence present in those hypotheticals. The
statistical evidence involved in the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals made explicit the import of the confidence principle,
but the confidence principle has wider applicability than the
controlled settings of those cases.
In Section IV, I will proceed to a discussion of Houchens v.
American Home Assurance Co.33 The Houchens case provides a
nice transition to Matsushita because it involves a clear application
of the confidence principle in the context of an actual case. The
Houchens court, however, failed to articulate that the justification
for summary judgment in that case was confidence rather than
probability. Instead, the court fell into the common trap of relying
upon the oft-quoted “equal inferences rule” as an explanation for
its decision. In this sense, Houchens is representative of a large
number of cases that come close to explicitly identifying the
confidence principle but instead bungle the explanation.
In Section V, I will examine the Matsushita opinion in light of
the distinction between probability and confidence. The Matsushita
case, compared to the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals and
the Houchens case, is not as obviously based on a confidence
analysis. An understanding of the opinion as deriving from
confidence principles thus requires some care and attention. This
section will ultimately demonstrate that Matsushita was based on a
confidence, rather than a probability, analysis. In doing so, the
benefits of this “reinterpretation” of Matsushita will also be
explored.
BLUE BUSES, GATECRASHERS, AND CONFIDENCE

II.

The first articulation of the confidence concept was the result
of efforts to explain two famous legal hypotheticals: the “blue bus”
and “gatecrasher” hypotheticals. Professor L. Jonathan Cohen first
33

927 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1991).
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posed the famous gatecrasher hypothetical in his book The
Probable and the Provable:
Consider, for example, a case in which it is
common ground that 499 people paid for admission
to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are counted on the seats,
of whom A is one. Suppose no tickets were issued
and there can be no testimony as to whether A paid
for admission or climbed over the fence. So by any
plausible criterion of mathematical probability there
is a .501 probability, on the admitted facts, that he
did not pay. The mathematicist theory would
apparently imply that in such circumstances the
rodeo organizers are entitled to judgment against A
for the admission-money, since the balance of
probability (and also the difference between prior
and posterior probabilities) would lie in their
favour. But it seems manifestly unjust that A should
lose his case when there is an agreed mathematical
probability of as high as .499 that he in fact paid for
admission.
Indeed, if the organizers were really entitled to
judgment against A, they would presumably be
equally entitled to judgment against each person in
the same situation as A. So they might conceivably
be entitled to recover 1,000 admission-moneys,
when it was admitted that 499 had actually been
paid. The absurd injustice of this suffices to show
that there is something wrong somewhere. But
where?34
The “gatecrasher” hypothetical is rivaled in fame (or infamy)
by Professor Laurence Tribe’s35 “blue bus” hypothetical. Professor
34

L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977).
According to Professor Tribe, he did not invent this hypothetical. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1341 n. 37 (1971) (calling the blue bus
hypothetical a “famous chestnut”). Nevertheless, the origin of this hypothetical
is generally attributed to Professor Tribe. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel
Shaviro, Veridal Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of
Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 257
35
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Tribe’s original hypothetical is rather straightforward and simple:
Consider next the cases in which the identity of the
responsible agent is in doubt. Plaintiff is negligently
run down by a blue bus. The question is whether the
bus belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff is prepared
to prove that defendant operates four-fifths of all the
blue buses in town. What effect, if any, should such
proof be given?36
Each of these hypotheticals presents a “paradox.” Almost all
commentators who have considered these hypotheticals presume
that each case would result in a court-ordered judgment for the
defendant, before the case even reached the jury.37 The paradox is
that the only available evidence on the disputed question of fact in
each hypothetical (“Did A pay for admission to the rodeo?” and
“Was plaintiff injured by defendant’s bus?”) requires a conclusion
that the fact needed for the plaintiff’s recovery is, more likely than
not, true. If anything, it seems as if the evidence would support a
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff rather than the
defendant: the best guess as to what actually happened clearly
supports the plaintiff’s factual “story” (“A is a gatecrasher” and “It
was defendant’s bus”) rather than the defendant’s “story” (“I am
not a gatecrasher” and “It was not our bus”). And, even more, there
can be no reasonable disagreement that the best guess as to
probability in each of these hypotheticals favors the plaintiff; the
beauty of these hypotheticals is that they eliminate any doubt as to
the probability of the material fact from the limited record
available.
The paradox of the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals can
only be resolved by carefully distinguishing the concepts of
probability and confidence, an insight that Professor Neil Cohen
first recognized in his article Confidence in Probability38 and
(1990) (attributing the blue bus hypothetical to Professor Tribe).
36
See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1340–41.
37
See Meier, supra note 1, at n.98
38
Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985). Even though
Professor Cohen essentially resolved the “paradox” of the blue bus and
gatecrasher hypotheticals decades ago, his maneuver in distinguishing between
probability and confidence has not been often replicated in the context of federal
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explored in depth in my article Confidence, Probability, and the
Reasonable Jury Standard.39 A cursory explanation of the
confidence principle should suffice for the purposes of this article;
those seeking a full discussion of the concept can find one in my
Reasonable Jury article. The reason that the defendant is entitled to
summary judgment in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals is
that there is not a sufficient amount of evidence such that there can
be a requisite level of confidence as to any probability assessment
from that evidence. In the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals, a
probability assessment from the available evidence favors the
plaintiff, a conclusion that the statistical nature of the available
evidence makes clear. Because the record evidence in the blue bus
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is so scarce, however, the probability
assessment necessarily involves a high “margin of error.” Even
though the probability conclusion compelled by statistical evidence
in the hypotheticals favors the plaintiff, there can be very little
confidence in the ultimate validity of this probability assessment. If
more evidence became available, it might dramatically alter the
probability of the disputed question of fact.40
Allowing the plaintiff to recover under the facts of the blue bus
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is akin to asking a meteorologist to
predict the chance of rain tomorrow based only on the weather for
that same day in the previous year. We might prefer the
meteorologist not make any prediction at all in this situation,
particularly if people are inclined to place too much reliance on the
meteorologist’s prediction and make decisions accordingly. The
same concept applies to disputed questions of fact in the litigation

civil procedure. As I explain in Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable
Jury Standard, much of the blame for the absence of a widespread incorporation
of Cohen’s insights should be attributed to the “reasonable jury” interpretation
of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which makes the delineation
of the probability and confidence principles very difficult. See Meier, supra
note 1. Another factor working against the full-scale adoption and incorporation
of Professor Cohen’s insights regarding probability and confidence is the
erroneous belief that the confidence principle is triggered only by the presence
of precise, statistical evidence such as that involved in the blue bus and
gatecrasher hypotheticals. This issue is discussed in Section III of this Article.
39
Meier, supra note 1.
40
See id.
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context and explains why commentators generally agree that the
defendant in each hypothetical should prevail, as a matter of law,
before the case even reaches the jury. Without sufficient
information, there can be little confidence in any probability
conclusion; in these situations, we prefer that the jury (or judge)
not be permitted to even draw a probability conclusion from the
scant record.
Thus, the blue bus and gatecrashers do not, in reality, present a
paradox. The paradox only exists if one presumes that the
summary judgment record is analyzed by a judge solely from the
perspective of probability. But this is not what occurs. A judge, in
determining whether to permit the case to go to a jury so that it can
engage in a probability assessment, also considers whether there is
a sufficient amount of evidence such that the legal system, and
society, can have a sufficient amount of confidence in any
probability conclusion from that evidence.41 Rather than presenting
a paradox, the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals precisely
identify, in a controlled and hypothetical setting, the importance of
distinguishing between confidence and probability.
III.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Before proceeding to an analysis of how the confidence
principle can be used to understand actual cases, one limitation of
the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals must be resolved.
Professor Tribe introduced the blue bus hypothetical as part of his
larger theory about the pitfalls of statistical evidence.42 Professor
41

On the question of who applies the confidence analysis, I disagree with
Professor Cohen. Professor Cohen believes that the confidence analysis is part
of a jury’s analysis of the burden of persuasion; I believe that the confidence
analysis is performed solely by a judge. See Meier, supra note 1. After all, the
presumed result of the blue bus and gatecrashers hypotheticals is that the
plaintiffs’ claims are thrown out before a jury determination. See id. Thus, the
principle that explains the “paradox” of these two hypotheticals—the confidence
analysis—must be performed by a judge rather than a jury if the pre-jury
disposition of these two hypotheticals is to be justified. The jury is ill-equipped
to engage in the types of policy weighing and legal interpretation that will
determine the requisite amount of confidence—or allowable “margin of error”—
for a particular case. See id.
42
See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1360–61 (explaining the “risk that the jury
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Tribe’s perspective stifled the entire discussion of the blue bus and
gatecrasher hypotheticals, because there is an almost complete
absence of efforts to apply the hypotheticals’ lessons to situations
involving circumstantial evidence, other than statistical evidence.43
Circumstantial evidence is commonly used in civil litigation in
federal courts.44 The type of overt statistical evidence used in
hypotheticals is, however, more rare.45 Thus, the presumption that
the hypotheticals are concerned only with overt statistical evidence
has probably contributed to the general failure to apply the lessons
from the gatecrasher and blue bus hypotheticals to real-world
cases. In fact, the lessons from the hypotheticals have broad import
to all cases involving circumstantial evidence, including—but not
limited to—cases involving the statistical circumstantial evidence
involved in the hypotheticals.
To understand this point, it is first necessary to develop a
working definition of what is meant by the terms circumstantial
evidence, direct evidence, and statistical evidence. In my article
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard, I
explore the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence
in more depth.46 I conclude that “direct evidence is evidence that,
if credible to the jury, proves the material fact in the litigation”47;
circumstantial evidence “is evidence that, if believed by the jury,
does not ‘directly prove’ the material fact to the litigation but
rather supplies an inference that the material fact occurred.”48
will give [statistical evidence] too much weight when undertaking to combine”
it with other types of evidence).
43
See Meier, supra note 1.
44
See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of
Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 243–63 (2006) (discussing
how juries undervalue circumstantial evidence and overvalue direct evidence
while assuming that circumstantial evidence is frequently used in everyday
litigation).
45
See Philip Mitchell Woolery, Death Before Comparable Worth: The
Limited Utility of Comparable Worth Evidence in a Title VII Cause of Action, 51
MO. L. REV. 811, 830 (1986) (explaining that attorneys will only rarely rely
exclusively on statistical evidence and will usually bring forward other types of
evidence, including non-statistical circumstantial evidence).
46
Meier, supra note 1.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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To illustrate the difference between direct and
circumstantial evidence, I use algebraic symbols to clarify the
additional inference required for circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence comports with the following algebraic relationship:
Testimony M  Fact M? In order to deduce Fact M from
Testimony M (represented by the arrow in the algebraic equation),
the jury must find Testimony M credible.49 With circumstantial
evidence, however, there is an additional logical step between the
adduced evidence and the relevant fact that is disputed in the
litigation; this can be algebraically depicted as follows: Testimony
X  Fact X  Fact M. Even if the jury believes the witness
with regard to his or her testimony regarding Fact X, the jury must
still resolve whether there is a relationship between the existence
of Fact X and Fact M.
In Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard,
I conclude that a judge has no ability at the summary judgment
stage to weigh in on the probability of whether the disputed
questions of fact exist when both parties have submitted direct
evidence on this point.50 Stated differently, a party with direct
evidence of a material fact satisfies the probability component of
the burden of production.51 I believe the same concept applies to
the issue of confidence. A plaintiff with direct evidence on a
material fact has satisfied her burden of production under the
confidence inquiry; in other words, a party who has direct evidence
on all material facts has “enough” evidence. Both the gatecrasher
and blue bus hypotheticals, as well as the two real-world cases
discussed in this section, involve situations in which a plaintiff
attempted to prove a material fact by circumstantial evidence only.
Thus, the widely accepted view that a party with direct evidence is
entitled to a jury trial seems to be true, 52 with regard to both the
49

Id.
See id.
51
Id. I discuss the burden of production and the burden of persuasion in
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard. I define the burden
of production as the obligation of a party to convince a judge to allow the case to
proceed to a jury trial, whereas the burden of persuasion is the obligation of a
party to convince a jury to find for that party. Id.
52
See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., 21B FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §5122 (2d ed. 2012) (“Where the party relies on direct evidence
50
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probability and confidence requirements.
The academic discussion of the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals, however, suggests that only a particular type of
circumstantial evidence—statistical circumstantial evidence—
implicates the confidence principle.53 There is no logical reason,
however, to limit the confidence principle to cases involving overt,
statistical evidence.
According to the model of circumstantial evidence developed
above, circumstantial evidence follows a pattern in which
testimony is used in an to attempt to prove a fact which is itself
probative of a material fact. Thus, circumstantial evidence requires
the following analytical path: Testimony  Fact X, Fact X 
Material Fact. Statistical evidence follows this same general
model. The only difference is that, with statistical evidence, the
relationship between Fact X and the Material Fact is
mathematically determined. Accordingly, testimony establishing
that 100 people attended the rodeo and that only 49 paid for
admission (Fact X) statistically resolves the inferential value of
Fact X to the Material Fact—whether the defendant paid admission
or crashed the gate. The same basic process is involved with other
circumstantial evidence that does not involve an explicit statistical
correlation for the jury but rather requires the jury to consider for
itself the probative value of the circumstantial evidence to the
material fact in question.54
Take, for instance, the relatively famous case of Smith v. Rapid
Transit,55 which commentators sometimes rely on to support the
conclusion that the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals would
end in a court-directed judgment for the defendant. The Smith case,

such as the testimony of a witness to the fact in issue, the judge plays a minimal
role because of the axiom that the credibility of the witness is to be decided by
the jury. The power of the judge increases, however, when a party relies upon
circumstantial evidence.”).
53
See Cohen, supra note 38, at 398 (explaining that probabilities
determined by a legal fact finder are best thought of estimates).
54
See Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252 (“All evidence is
probabilistic, in the sense that there is a risk of error in relying on it to support a
factual conclusion about a case.”).
55
58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
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which was the basis of the blue bus hypothetical,56 involved a
dispute in which the plaintiff had been injured by a bus.57 The
defendant contested the ownership of the bus involved in the
accident. The plaintiff had presented circumstantial evidence that
the defendant had the exclusive franchise for operating a bus line
on the street in which the accident occurred. 58 The lower court
directed a verdict for the defendant, and the Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed this result.59 In affirming the defendant’s
directed verdict, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned as
follows: “The most that can be said of the evidence in the instant
case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the
proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident. This
was not enough.” 60
Thus, although Smith is similar to the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals, it is different because the statistical probability that
another bus line was involved in the accident on Main Street could
not be reduced to an exact statistical probability.61 The evidence in
Smith did not lend itself to a precise determination of the probative
value of “Fact X” (that the defendant owned the only license to
operate a bus route on Main Street) to the “Material Fact”
(ownership of the bus that caused the accident). In order to
determine the probative value of the circumstantial—but not
statistical—evidence offered in Smith, more work was necessary.
Additional questions had to be resolved. In Smith, this might
require information as to the frequency with which other buses
traveled down Main Street compared to the frequency with which
the defendant’s buses operated on Main Street.
Thus, in a case like Smith involving circumstantial evidence
that is not statistical evidence, more work is required in order to
56

See Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance
of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 531 (1989) (explaining that the blue bus
hypothetical is based on the Smith case).
57
Smith, 58 N.E.2d. at 754–55.
58
Id. at 755.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See id. (“The most that can be said of the evidence in the instant case is
that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition that a
bus of the defendant caused the accident.”).
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determine the probative value of the evidence. The task of
accessing this probative value of the evidence is difficult in Smith,
while in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals the hard work
is already done for the jury.62 In both situations, however, the same
type of reasoning process is required. As Professors Jonathon
Koehler and Daniel Shaviro have stated, “All evidence is
probabilistic . . .”63 It is just that the probabilistic nature of
statistical evidence is more apparent than for it is for “nonstatistical” circumstantial evidence.64 The reason that overt,
statistical evidence was used in the hypotheticals is simply because
the “paradox” of these hypotheticals is more easily realized when
statistical evidence is used.
Simply because the statistical probability process was made
more acute in the hypotheticals, however, is no reason to ignore
the lessons from those hypotheticals when applying them to the
more common situation in which the relationship between the
underlying fact (“Fact X”) and the material fact (“Material Fact”)
cannot be reduced to a precise statistical relationship. The
hypotheticals deftly pinpointed a “paradox” that was resolved by
the confidence principle. The resolution of the paradox, however,
applies to real-world scenarios in which the paradox is less clearly
defined due to the absence of statistical evidence.65 In short, the
problem that the confidence principle resolved is not simply a
62

That the inferential value of statistical circumstantial evidence is made
explicit for the jury is part of Professor Tribe’s concern about the risk associated
with this evidence. See Tribe, supra note 35, at 1331 (“[I]n at least some
contexts, permitting any use of certain mathematical methods entails a
sufficiently high risk of misuse . . . that it would be irrational not to take such
misuse into account when deciding whether to permit the methods to be
employed at all.”).
63
Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252.
64
See Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, A Collateral Attack on the Legal
Maxim That Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Unquantifiable, 5 LAW,
PROB., & RISK 135, 142 (2007) (“In short, although it is not possible to do
statistics without doing probability, it is possible to do probability without doing
statistics.”); Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 401, 421 n.67 (1986) (arguing that the distinction between “naked
statistical evidence” and “personalized” evidence is “insupportable”).
65
See Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 35, at 252 (“Overtly probabilistic
evidence, however, makes the risk of error explicit.”).
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problem arising from statistical evidence; rather, it is a problem
that potentially arises from all circumstantial evidence. The use of
statistical evidence in the blue bus and gatecrasher hypothetical
merely defined the problem with more clarity.
HOUCHENS V. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.

IV.

The case of Houchens v. American Home Assurance Co.66
involves a clear application of the confidence principle in a realworld —as opposed to a hypothetical—case, and thus serves as a
nice transition to the discussion of Matsushita in the following
section. In Houchens, a woman brought a life insurance policy
claim after her husband had gone missing.67 The husband had been
overseas for a job in Saudi Arabia when he took a trip to Bangkok,
Thailand.68 Although immigration records revealed that he had
arrived in Bangkok and entered the country,69 he had not been seen
or heard from since his arrival.70 After approximately eight years,71
the wife, the policy’s beneficiary, brought suit against the life
insurer.72 The wife was the beneficiary under the policy.73 In order
to recover on the policy, the wife needed to show that her husband
had died of accidental causes.74 Under a Virginia statute, she was
entitled to a presumption that her husband had died because he had
been missing for over seven years, but in order to recover under
the policy she still needed to prove that he had died of an
accidental cause.75 The insurance company brought a motion for
summary judgment regarding the question of whether the
husband’s death (presumed as a matter of law to have occurred)
had been accidental.76
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

927 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 164–65.
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The district court granted the motion,77 and the wife appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.78 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged the lack of available direct evidence regarding the
husband’s cause of death,79 and noted that the case depended upon
the effect of the “highly” circumstantial evidence contained in the
record. In addition, the court acknowledged that although the
“sparse” circumstantial evidence in the case—that the husband
entered Thailand during a vacation from his job in Saudi Arabia—
supported an inference of accidental death, the same evidence was
also consistent with non-accidental causes of death such as suicide,
murder, or natural causes.80
If Houchens is considered from a probability analysis only, the
defendant’s summary judgment should have been reversed by the
Second Circuit. The material fact (Material Fact M) was the
manner in which the husband died. The record contained the
undisputed facts involving the husband’s vacation to Thailand
(Fact X). Thus, this fits the model of circumstantial evidence
developed in the previous section, in which the jury is asked to
infer Material Fact M from Fact X: Fact X  Fact M. The court
in Houchens acknowledged that deducing Fact M from Fact X was
reasonable. Indeed, the court expressly conceded that “Mr.
Houchens might have died accidentally.”81 If the court believed,
based on the record evidence, that Mr. Houchens might have died
accidentally, surely a jury would not have been unreasonable in
reaching the same conclusion. Thus, the decision of the Fourth
Circuit affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant
cannot be explained through a probability analysis.
However, the result in Houchens makes perfect sense under a
confidence analysis. The problem in Houchens is not that it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the husband died accidentally.
Rather, the problem is that there is so little evidence regarding the
manner of the husband’s death that there can be little confidence in
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 167.
Id.
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any conclusion regarding probability on this point.
Unfortunately, rather than clearly articulating the confidence
principle as the true basis for the summary judgment in favor of the
defendant in Houchens, the Second Circuit justified its decision
using language that is sometimes described as the “equal
inferences rule.”82 In Houchens, the court states:
This is a case where the inferences show equal
support for opposing conclusions. Mr. Houchens
might have died accidentally. However, it is equally
likely that he was murdered, that he died of natural
causes, that he took his own life, or that he just went
away somewhere and lives yet.83
The Houchens court is not alone in using the equal inferences
“rule” as justification for summary judgment in a case in which
there is very little available evidence on a probative fact; many
courts have dealt with the problem of the scarcity of evidence
regarding a material fact by resorting to this “rule.”84 Inreality,
82

Id.
Id.
84
The most famous application of the equal inference rule might have
occurred in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933). In
Chamberlain, the Court considered an appeal by a plaintiff against whom a
directed verdict had been entered at the trial court level. See id. at 333. The
plaintiff wished to rely on circumstantial evidence to show that the employees of
the defendant had been negligent and had caused the death of the plaintiff. See
id. at 337–38. In affirming the trial court’s directed verdict (contrary to the
reversal by Judge Learned Hand writing for the Second Circuit), the Supreme
Court stated:
We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of cases
where proven facts give equal support to each of two
inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being
established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the
party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these
inferences as against the other, before he is entitled to recover.
Id. at 339. This passage, containing equal inference type language, suggests that
the underlying problem in Chamberlain was the scarcity of record evidence on
the disputes question of fact. Under this reading, Chamberlain is similar to a
case such as Houchens that is clearly based on a confidence analysis. On the
other hand, other portions of the Chamberlain case suggest that the Court’s
decision was based on a probability analysis. See, e.g., id. at 342–43 (generally
dismissing the probative value of the plaintiff’s evidence).
83
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though, the equal inference rule is just a somewhat inarticulate
explanation of the result required when the plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the confidence analysis within the burden of production.
Pursuant to the usual explanation of the equal inferences rule,
when there is circumstantial evidence of a material fact that offers
precisely equal support for both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
respective positions on that material fact, summary judgment is
appropriate against the party with the burden of proof at trial.85 The
theory is that the burden of production is not met because the
evidence is equally consistent with the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
versions of the material facts, and in this situation the burden of
persuasion at trial would necessitate that this tie be resolved
against the party on which the burden of persuasion rests.86
Even though there is a superficial appeal to the “equal
inferences” rule as a clever melding of the burden of production
and burden of persuasion,87 a closer inspection reveals the
analytical deficiencies in this train of thought. The problem with
the “equal inferences” rule, and the problem with using this rule as
an explanation for a case like Houchens, is that the rule presumes
that a court—as opposed to a jury—is to analyze the probative
strength of circumstantial evidence and come to a precise
conclusion as to the probabilities of that disputed material fact.88
In any event, there are numerous cases in which the court’s reliance on the
equal inferences rule is clearly based on a perceived lack of confidence in any
probability conclusion drawn from the record because of the scant evidence on a
disputed, material fact. See, e.g., Dorsaneo, supra note 8, at 1710–11
(examining case law with regard to the equal inferences rule and concluding that
most courts have, correctly, rejected the rule); see also Michael S. Pardo &
Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 15
(2011) (employing an equal-inferences analysis as part of their advocacy of the
‘inferences to the best explanation’ understanding of the burden of persuasion).
85
See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.
1984) (“When circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and
nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact can be
inferred.”).
86
See, e.g., Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39, 41–42 (9th Cir. 1997)
(explaining the rule).
87
For a complete discussion of the relationship between the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion, see Meier, supra note 1.
88
See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 405 (1943) (Black, J.,
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This view of the judge’s responsibility with regard to the
probability question is misguided89 The judge’s analysis of
probability at the burden of production stage is deferential. The
judge does not precisely determine the probative effect of the
circumstantial evidence in the record, but rather the judge
considers whether a jury’s conclusion on the material fact, for
either the plaintiff or the defendant, would be reasonable.90 Under
the equal inference rule, however, a judge is presumably to assign
a rather specific percentage as to the probative effect of
dissenting) (stating that the equal inferences rule “assumes that a judge can
weigh conflicting evidence with mathematical precision”); Dorsaneo, supra note
8, at 1710–11 (“[T]he ‘equal inferences rule’ is not merely unnecessary it is
actually quite harmful. In the hands of a reviewing judge who wants to violate
the jury’s province so as to impose his or her own idiosyncratic preferences on
the case, the ‘equal inferences rule’ [requires only that the judge] declare that the
inferences are equal.”). The equal inference rule does have some arguably
legitimate hypothetical applications, but in these contrived situations the rule is
better articulated as a rule of evidence as opposed to a rule of procedure. For
instances, if a plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence of a material fact, and
the plaintiff concedes (perhaps in the form of expert testimony) that this
circumstantial evidence is exactly equally consistent with the plaintiff’s version
of a material fact as the defendant’s version, summary judgment against the
plaintiff would be appropriate. Under this unusual situation, it is questionable
whether this evidence would even meet the test for relevancy under Federal Rule
of Evidence 401. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable that it
would be without the evidence” (emphasis added)); cf. Roger C. Park et al.,
Bayes Wars Redivivus—An Exchange, in 8 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1,
10–38 (2010) (discussing—amongst other interesting issues—the relevance of
evidence that is equally consistent with the plaintiff and the defendant’s
explanation of the evidence). In reality, however, a party’s attorney will almost
always take the position that the circumstantial, non-statistical evidence makes
that party’s version of a material fact more probable. Cf. Lozana v. Lozana, 52
S.W.3d 141, 157 (Tex. 2001) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It is a rule of logic, as well as law, that when the existence of a fact does
not make one possible inference more probable than another, no inference can
be drawn at all. For example, one cannot infer from a photograph showing the
sun on the horizon that it is either sunrise or sunset; each is a possibility—
indeed, they are the only possibilities—but if nothing else is known, neither
possibility is any more likely than the other.”).
89
See Meier, supra note 1.
90
See supra text at notes 74–80.
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circumstantial evidence, and then—if the inferences to be drawn
are exactly in equipoise—the judge is to enter judgment against the
party with the burden of persuasion at trial.
The equal inferences “rule” is thus flawed because it assumes
that a judge precisely determines an exact estimate of the
probabilities on a disputed material fact. Even apart from this error,
however, the equal inference rule is internally nonsensical. For
instance, consider a case in which the judge determines that the
circumstantial evidence slightly favors the defendant’s version of a
material fact. In this instance, the equal inference rule is—by
definition—not triggered because the evidence does not equally
support a conclusion for either the plaintiff or the defendant on a
disputed question of material fact. But, notice the illogical result
under the equal inferences “rule” if the judge believes that the
defendant’s version of the facts is exactly as likely as the plaintiff’s
version of the facts. In this scenario, according to the equal
inferences rule, the judge is to enter summary judgment for the
defendant. However, if the judge believes that the evidence slightly
favors the defendant but that reasonable minds could differ on this
conclusion, the judge is presumably required to submit the case to
the jury. Under the equal inferences rule, then, the defendant is
better off convincing the court that the circumstantial evidence
favors each side equally than in convincing the court that the
circumstantial evidence slightly favors the defendant!
The equal inference “rule” could be understood as a rule that
applies in cases like Houchens when judges intuitively realize that
the defendant is entitled to summary judgment but that this
conclusion cannot be justified under a probability analysis. In
other words, a case like Houchens presents a real-life judge with a
real-life “paradox” similar to the “paradox” exposed in the blue
bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals. The solution to this real-life
“paradox” is the same as the solution to the “paradox” posed by the
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals: the confidence concept. In
reality, a case such as Houchens does not present a paradox once
the decision is understood from the perspective that there simply
was not enough evidence to afford the legal system sufficient
confidence in any probability assessment from that evidence.
Clearly articulating the confidence concept is challenging,
however, and the “equal inferences rule” is an unfortunate
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byproduct of the difficulty associated with verbalizing the
confidence concept.
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO. V. ZENITH RADIO
CORP.

V.

The Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio
Corporation91 litigation involved an antitrust claim by two
American corporations against twenty-one Japanese corporations.92
Both the plaintiffs and defendants were in the business of
producing television sets, with the defendants selling their products
in both the Japanese and American markets.93 The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants illegally conspired to keep the price of
their television sets artificially low in the American market.94 The
ultimate goal of this conspiracy, according to the plaintiffs, was to
drive American television set producers out of the American
market.95 To prevail on their claims, the plaintiffs had to prove that
the defendants’ low prices in the United States were the result of
an actual agreement among the defendants.96 Under wellestablished antitrust principles, if the various defendants’ prices
were simply the result of independent, parallel conduct by each of
the defendants, no liability existed.97
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgment for the defendants.98 The Supreme
Court summarized the district court’s conclusion as follows: “At
bottom, the court found, [Plaintiffs’] claims rested on the
inferences that could be drawn from [defendants’] parallel conduct
in the Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of that
conduct on [Defendants’] American competitors.”99 Thus, although
91

475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577.
93
Id. at 577–78.
94
Id. at 578.
95
Id. at 577–78.
96
Id. at 584–86.
97
Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 764 (1984)).
98
Id. at 579.
99
Id.
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the plaintiffs had not asserted a viable legal claim by simply
proving that the defendants had all sold television sets at
artificially high prices in Japan and artificially low prices in the
United States, the plaintiffs wished to use this parallel conduct as
circumstantial evidence that an illegal conspiracy existed between
the defendants.100 Using the model of circumstantial evidence
developed above,101 the plaintiffs wished to introduce testimony
(Testimony X) about parallel conduct (Fact X) to prove a
conspiracy (Fact M): Testimony X  Fact X  Fact M.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.102 The Third Circuit
concluded “that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to
depress prices in the American market in order to drive out
American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess
profits obtained in the Japanese market.”103 The Supreme Court
subsequently reversed the Third Circuit.104
Determining the precise rationale for the Court’s decision in
Matsushita is a difficult task; commentators have struggled with
the case for over twenty-five years.105 Figuring out Matsushita is a
bit like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube: there are different sides to
the problem, and while it might appear that you have solved the
problem from one side, turning the Cube to a different side reveals
that the maneuvers you have made to solve one side of the Cube
have scrambled the other sides. Along these lines, any serious
100

Id. at 584–85.
See supra Part III.
102
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 580.
103
Id. at 581.
104
Id. at 598.
105
See generally Nickolai G. Levin, The Nomos and Narrative of
Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1631 (2005) (“Nineteen years later,
courts and commentators still struggle to decipher what the Matsushita standard
requires and how to reconcile that with the Court’s prior summary judgment
jurisprudence, which was generally plaintiff permissive. Matsushita’s broad
language created many questions: Should judges limit inferences at the summary
judgment stage in all antitrust cases or only a subset (and, if so, which subset)?
When ascertaining whether the evidence ‘tends to exclude’ the possibility of
independent action, should the judge weigh the evidence? How are deterrence
concerns related to that standard? Does Matsushita apply outside antitrust?”)
(internal citations omitted).
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account of Matsushita must take into account the following aspects
of the case: (1) the language in the opinion pronouncing that the
Court was reviewing the legal standard for summary judgment; (2)
the language suggesting that the Court’s decision was based on the
Court’s view of the probability of the alleged conspiracy; (3) the
language indicating that the antitrust context of the dispute was
important to the Court’s analysis; (4) the Court’s reliance on its
previous holding in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.106;
(5) the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; (6) the Seventh Amendment right to a federal jury trial;
(7) the Court’s subsequent description of the Matsushita holding in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.107; (8) the
contemporary view that Matsushita is a critically important
precedent; and (9) the notion that Matsushita helps defendants and
hurts plaintiffs.
As it turns out, Matsushita is a Rubik’s Cube that cannot be
completely solved; no interpretation of Matsushita can account for
all of the above factors, meaning that something has to give.
However, the interpretation of Matsushita advanced in this
Article—that Matsushita was decided according to a confidence
analysis similar to that involved in the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals and the Houchens case discussed above—comes
pretty close to accounting for all of these variables. What is
ultimately sacrificed is the language in the Matsushita opinion
suggesting that the case depended upon the Court’s view of the
probability of the conspiracy alleged by the Plaintiffs, although I
offer a theory as to how this language made its way into the
Court’s opinion. In addition, the contemporary view that
Matsushita is an important summary judgment precedent must be
reevaluated. Although Matsushita is still an important case under
the theory advanced herein, it is not the “game-changing”
precedent that dramatically alters the respective roles of the trial
court judge and jury with regard to disputed questions of fact. The
case is sometimes read and used in this manner, but this
interpretation should be rejected.
The dissection of Matsushita below is, admittedly, somewhat
106
107

465 U.S. 752 (1984).
504 U.S. 451, 478–79 (1992).
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tedious. Considering the import of Matsushita, however, this
scrutiny is justified. Properly understanding the case as one
decided according to a confidence inquiry (1) requires a
reassessment of the summary judgment “revolution” that was
prompted in part by Matsushita and (2) justifies the plausibility
standard introduced by the Court in Twombly. In light of the
stakes involved, a thorough and detailed examination of
Matsushita is warranted.
A. The Probability Understanding of Matsushita
There are two fundamental ways to read Matsushita: through
the probability principle and the confidence principle. This section
discusses the probability reading. Under this reading, Matsushita
revolved around the probability of the alleged conspiracy. This is
the way that most lower courts and commentators have read
Matsushita.108 However, there are serious problems with this view
of the case.
The Matsushita litigation depended upon the effect to be given
circumstantial evidence. Recall that the dispositive factual question
in the Matsushita litigation was whether the defendants’ parallel,
low prices on television sets sold in the United States were the
result of independent action or an agreement among the
defendants.109 The plaintiffs had no direct evidence that an
108

See, e.g., Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional
Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321,
329 (1989) (“The result and reasoning in Matsushita virtually command the trial
judge to invade the jury’s province . . . .”).
109
See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596–97. Of course, determining what
distinguishes “independent action” from an “agreement” is a question of law,
and the resolution of this legal question is more complex than it might initially
appear. See generally William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action,
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 405–65 (2007) (concluding that the concept of an
illegal antitrust agreement can only exist if there is communication between the
conspirators and demonstrating that the recent cases support his definition,
despite the contrasting school of thought (led by Judge Richard Posner) that tacit
agreements and interdependent conduct also falls within the prohibition of
Section of the Sherman Act); see also William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and
the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597 (2009) (discussing
whether the infamous “Gary dinners,” in which American steel executives
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agreement had been reached; there was no “smoking gun” witness
to testify to witnessing an agreement being reached or to seeing a
document memorializing the agreement.
Thus, the illegal
agreement would have to be proven by circumstantial evidence.
The plaintiffs had a variety of circumstantial evidence
suggesting that the parallel low prices set by defendants in the
United States were the result of an agreement. First, of course, was
the fact that the defendants’ prices were uniformly low.110 In
attempting to prove a conspiracy to agree to set low prices, it is
obviously necessary that the prices be uniformly low.111 It would
make no sense for the plaintiffs to allege a conspiracy to engage in
certain conduct when that conduct has not, in fact, occurred.112 As
the Court noted in Matsushita, however, the fact that the
defendants were uniformly selling television sets in the United
States at low prices could also be explained by independent action
by each of the defendants.113 Although this might initially seem
improbable (how often do twenty-one people or entities engage in
the exact some behavior without some sort of agreement?), if the
gathered for a frank exchange of information regarding their businesses
(including wages and prices), constitute an illegal agreement under the Sherman
Act). The Supreme Court, in Matsushita, assumed that the dispositive question
to the litigation was a factual one as to whether an agreement existed and not
over the definition of what constitutes an agreement, and this Article will
proceed under the same assumption.
110
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584.
111
It is theoretically possible that the government might initiate a
prosecution for an agreement that was later backed out of, but this seems
unlikely.
112
In this instance, the plaintiff pursuing a civil cause of action would not
have suffered damages if an agreement—but no conduct—had occurred. It is
the act that produces the damages to the plaintiff. This should be distinguished,
however, from the criminal prosecution of a conspiracy. In the criminal context,
the legislature might have an interest in prohibiting an agreement to engage in a
conspiracy even the agreement does not result in action. See United States v.
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11, 15–17 (1994) (upholding a criminal conviction under
federal statute prohibiting conspiracy to distribute narcotics even though no
overt act by the defendant had been proven); see also had occurred); see also
Model Penal Code § 5.03(5) (stating that an overt act must be alleged and
proved except in cases where the crime conspired to is a first or second degree
felony).
113
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87.
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companies were each independently reacting to the same market
conditions, the parallel conduct could actually be the result of
independent action. Consider, for instance, the trend of cola
companies to produce diet versions of their products. This common
strategy by each of the cola makers was obviously not the result of
an agreement amongst the producers. Rather, each producer was
responding to the same market conditions—demand by consumers
for diet versions of cola.
The Matsushita plaintiffs’ evidence went beyond the
defendants’ parallel conduct of uniformly low prices in the United
States, however. The plaintiffs also had direct evidence that the
defendants had actually engaged in other agreements or
conspiracies.114 The plaintiffs had direct testimony that the
defendants had cooperated to maintain artificially high prices for
their products in the Japanese market.115 Similarly, the plaintiffs
also had evidence that the defendants had cooperated in various
ways in the American market, albeit not in ways that gave rise to a
claim by the plaintiffs against the defendants.116 This evidence was
clearly probative of whether the defendants’ low prices in the
American market were the result of a conspiracy. If the defendants
had entered into, maintained, and enforced business agreements in
other settings, the likelihood is greater that the defendants had
done so in the manner alleged by plaintiffs. If one wants to prove
that Bonnie and Clyde entered into a conspiracy to rob a particular
bank, it is helpful to establish that Bonnie and Clyde had worked
together on previous projects.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Matsushita, however,
focuses mostly on another bit of circumstantial evidence
rather than that discussed above. The plaintiffs’ theory in
Matsushita was that the defendants had agreed to artificially
hold their prices low in an effort to eventually force the
plaintiffs out of the American market.117 This business
strategy is often called “predatory pricing.”118 As the academic
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 584, n.8.
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literature cited by the Court notes,119 predatory pricing is a
somewhat risky business strategy because it requires a
company to forgo present gains (represented by the higher
price that could currently be charged for the product) in the
hopes of capitalizing on larger gains in the future when
competition has been eliminated.120 According to the plaintiffs’
complaint in Matsushita, the defendants conspired to engage in an
ambitious predatory pricing scheme that required the elimination
of well-established American companies over a long period of
time.121 In Matsushita, the Court discusses the ambitious nature of
the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy and suggests that the
defendants did not have a “motive” to enter the conspiracy. 122 To
119

Id. at 589.
Id. at 588–89.
121
Id. at 590.
122
Admittedly, the Court’s use of the term “motive” in Matsushita is a
somewhat obscure manner of saying that the Court doubted the existence of the
conspiracy. Alleged antitrust conspirators always have a motive to engage in an
illegal antitrust conspiracy—to increase their profits. Whether that motive
results in a conspiracy depends (among on other factors) on whether the
conspirators believe the arrangement can be successfully implemented, and the
likelihood—and cost—of antitrust litigation if the conspiracy is successful.
Under the probability reading of Matsushita, the Court doubted that a conspiracy
such as the one alleged by the plaintiff could be successfully executed. (The
Court presumably, then, believed that the alleged conspirators would come to
the same conclusion regarding the likelihood of success of that conspiracy.)
Saying that there is no “motive” to engage in the activity, however, essentially
hides the underlying assumption on which that conclusion regarding “motive” is
based.
Moreover, some have doubted that a conspiracy need always be motivated
by a desire to increase profits. For instance, in his Matsushita dissent, Justice
White considers that a firm might be motivated by growth rather than profitmaximization. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598 (White, J., dissenting). Others
have explained that a desire for “workforce stability and industrial growth”
might justify a preference for growth over profit-maximization. David F.
Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through an Extension of Colgate: The
Matsushita Case, 55 TENN. L. REV. 261, 285 (1988); see also Michael J.
Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment:
The Supreme Court’s Profound,
Persuasive, and Problematic Presumption About Human Behavior, 43 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 593, 595 (2012) (arguing that Matsushita’s “presumption that persons
and businesses make purely rational choices with a singular intent to maximize
their wealth” has been “discredited”).
120
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play on the analogy made previously: Why would Bonnie and
Clyde conspire to rob a heavily-guarded bank when there is a good
chance that the bank’s vaults would be empty on the day of the
robbery?123
In addition to the “motive” language, other language in
Matsushita also suggests that the Court’s conclusion was based on
a probability assessment. The Court discusses the “implausible”124
nature of the alleged conspiracy and the necessity that the plaintiffs
come forward with “more persuasive evidence”125 to support their
claim. The Court mentions that the length of time under which this
conspiracy has continued suggests that “the conspiracy does not in
fact exist.”126 Moreover, the Court discounted the value of the
record evidence showing that the defendants had previously
worked together to form agreements regarding business operations
in both the Japanese and American markets.127
Although these portions of Matsushita suggest a probability
analysis,128 problems arise under this interpretation. To
demonstrate these problems, it will be helpful to quickly examine
the nature of a judge’s probability analysis at the summary
judgment stage. In this regard, consider the following depiction of
a judge’s analysis of probability at the summary judgment stage:129
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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590.
Id. at 587.
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Id.
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Id. at 592.
127
The Court’s opinion also discounts the plaintiffs’ expert report. Id. at
594 n.19 (“[I]n our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has
little probative value in comparison with the economic factors, discussed in Part
IV-A, supra, that suggest that such conduct is irrational.”).
128
See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island:
Is It Time to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS. U. L. REV. 153,
170 (1997) (“Matsushita clearly requires the trial judge to thoroughly assess the
facts—dare I say weigh?—in order to determine if a jury could reach one or
more conclusions supported by the evidence.”).
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The development of this chart is more fully discussed in Probability,
Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard. See Meier, supra note 1.
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Figure A
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of the Evidence
In Figure A, the probability issue is charted horizontally, with
the right side of the line representing 100% probability that the
material fact alleged by the plaintiff did—in fact—occur, and the
left side of the chart representing 0% probability that alleged
material fact occurred. Because a judge’s analysis regarding
probability at summary judgment is merely to determine whether
to send the case to the jury, the judge asks only whether a
reasonable jury could resolve the disputed question of fact for
either the plaintiff or the defendant.130 The nature of this judicial
inquiry explains the remaining features of Figure A. First, because
the judge is considering how the jury might reasonably resolve the
disputed question of fact, the burden of persuasion applicable to
the jury’s decision must be considered. In Figure A, the usual
burden of persuasion used for civil litigation—a preponderance of
the evidence—has been used and marked at the corresponding
50% probability point. Second, recall that the role of a judge is not
to act as the fact-finder, but rather to determine whether the record
is such that a jury would be reasonable in deciding the case for
either party to the dispute. Thus, a judge must assign a range of
probability assessments that represents a “reasonable” conclusion
from the evidence. This notion is captured by the shaded bar on top
of the horizontal probability continuum. In Figure A, the judge has
130

The reasonable jury standard nicely captures the relation between judge
and jury with regard to probability (albeit not with regard to confidence). See
Meier, supra note 1.
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examined the record evidence and concluded that a range of
probability conclusions from the evidence would be reasonable.
Because the range assigned by the judge extends over the 50%
probability point associated with the preponderance of the
evidence burden of persuasion, a jury would be reasonable in
resolving the disputed question of fact in favor of either the
plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, summary judgment is not
appropriate in Figure A and the case must proceed to a jury trial.
Of course, in Matsushita, the Court did conclude that summary
judgment—for the defendants—was appropriate. Thus, if the Court
decided Matsushita according to a probability analysis, the range
of reasonable probability assessments (on the question of whether
the defendants had, in fact, engaged in an illegal conspiracy) must
have been wholly to the left of the relevant preponderance of the
evidence standard. This might occur for two different reasons. A
discussion of each follows below.
1.

The “No Chance!” Probability Interpretation of
Matsushita

The first probability interpretation of Matsushita I will label as
the “No Chance!” interpretation. Under this view, the Court
thought the alleged conspiracy was extremely unlikely. Thus, the
probability range assigned by the Court in Matsushita was
completely to the left of the preponderance of the evidence point
because, even allowing for “reasonable” differences, a jury could
not legitimately conclude that the conspiracy had—more likely
than not—actually occurred. This variation of the probability
understanding of Matsushita is depicted below in Figure B:
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Figure B
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Under Figure B, the Matsushita Court would start with the
presumption that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy was extremely
improbable. Even after allowing for reasonable disagreements
regarding the probative value of the record, the range of reasonable
conclusions did not extend beyond the relevant 50% mark
associated with the preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus,
summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate.
The “No Chance!” view of Matsushita is flatly inconsistent
with portions of the Matsushita opinion. Indeed, the Court was
careful to emphasize that its decision to reinstate the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment was not simply the result of a
disagreement with the Third Circuit over the probative value of the
record evidence. Matsushita opens with the following declaration:
“This case requires that we again consider the standard district
courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary
judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.”131 To underscore this
point, Matsushita reiterates “that we review only the standard
applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and not the
weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence.”132 In each of
these statements, the Court seems to be stressing that the issue
before the Court involves a question about the legal standard for
summary judgment.
Under the “No Chance!” view of Matsushita, however, the
Court’s conclusion was based solely on the Court’s analysis of the
131
132

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
Id. at 577.
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probative value it assigned to the various pieces of circumstantial
evidence in the record. This evaluation of evidence and assigning
of probabilities is not a legal inquiry into the standard governing
summary judgment but rather an inquiry into the probative value of
a particular evidentiary record. The Court in Matsushita seemed to
be adamant, though, that the result did not depend on this sort of
evidentiary inquiry. The problem with the Third Circuit’s
conclusion, according to the Court, was not that it had come to the
wrong conclusion regarding the probative value of the evidence
but that it had used the wrong legal standard.133 Thus, unless the
Court misstated its reasoning in Matsushita, the opinion did not
depend simply on the Court’s own views regarding the probative
value of the evidence.
Not surprisingly, then, nobody seems to interpret Matsushita as
simply a product of Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, Marshall,
and O’Connor’s134 views regarding the probability value of the
record evidence in that case. Primarily, the debate regarding
Matsushita has been whether the “new” legal approach to
summary judgment contained therein should be limited to the
antitrust context only or applied broadly to other cases. Even those
who believe Matsushita applies only to the antitrust context do not
do so under the theory that the case hinged on the Court’s own
view of the probability of an agreement in that particular case.135
Thus, there seems to be a general consensus that Matsushita is an
important case that informs the legal standard a trial court judge
must apply in deciding summary judgment. The analysis of the
Court pursuant to the “No Chance!” interpretation of Matsushita
does not address the standard a district court judge must apply at
the summary judgment stage but merely represents the result that
must occur in a particular case when a court believes the summary
judgment evidence produced in that litigation is predominantly
one-sided.
133
134

Id.
These five Justices constituted the majority in Matsushita. See id. at

576.
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See Schwarzer & Hirsch, supra note 16, at 6–7 (concluding that
Matsushita “rests on a specific point of antitrust law” that precludes plaintiffs
from relying solely on legal business conduct to prove an illegal antitrust
agreement).
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Probability

A second way the Court could have used a probability analysis
to reach the conclusion that the Matsushita defendants were
entitled to summary judgment is the “What Is Reasonable?”
probability view. Under this view, the reason that the probability
range was to the left of the preponderance of the evidence point
was because the Court redefined the allowance judges should make
for “reasonable” disagreements over probability of a material fact
from the summary judgment record. This view is depicted below in
Figure C:
Figure C
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In Figure C, summary judgment is appropriate because the
range of probability assessments representing “reasonable” jury
conclusions shrank. Since the Court was less generous in
characterizing deviations from the Court’s own views regarding
probability as “reasonable,” the case is now one in which the only
reasonable probability conclusions from the summary judgment
record are to the left of the important burden of persuasion point.
Thus, a decision in favor of the defendant at the summary
judgment stage is appropriate because a jury verdict for the
defendant is the only reasonable conclusion from the record
evidence.
The “What Is Reasonable?” probability view of Matsushita
addresses one of the shortcomings associated with the “No
Chance!” view. The “What Is Reasonable?” view of Matsushita is
consistent with language in the opinion indicating that the question
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before the court was the “standard district courts must apply when
deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust
conspiracy case.”136 According to the “What is Reasonable?”
reading of Matsushita, the Supreme Court’s legal standard was
different from the standard used by the Court of Appeals because
the Supreme Court’s standard required district court judges to be
less tolerant in establishing the range of “reasonable” conclusions
that could be drawn from a summary judgment record.137 Thus, the
Court’s characterization of the issue presented in Matsushita as
involving the summary judgment standard (rather than the
application of that standard to a particular case) is consistent with
the “What is Reasonable?” understanding of Matsushita.
In addition, the “What is Reasonable?” view of Matsushita is
consistent with the widely-held view that Matsushita is an
important case regarding the law of summary judgment. If the
Court decided in Matsushita that trial court judges should
generally be less willing to allow for deviations from their own
136

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 576.
Because courts (at both the trial court level and the appellate level) do
not use mathematical expressions to delineate their views of the “reasonable”
range of probability assessments from a particular evidentiary record, it is
somewhat difficult to conceive how an appellate court would know that a lower
court was applying the wrong standard in performing this task. Nevertheless, I
believe that it is a mistake to assume that the standard is being misapplied if
appellate courts are frequently reversing the grant of summary judgment by
lower courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism
Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, (2012) (“Grants of summary judgment are reversed at too
high a rate to have been properly granted. The very premise of summary
judgment is that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, that no
reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, and that the law is so clear that
there is no valid reason to postpone entry of judgment. By these standards, the
grant of summary judgment (partial or whole) by a federal district judge (at least
on no-genuine-dispute-of-fact grounds) should be affirmed nearly 100% of the
time.”). Any legal principle, regardless of whether it is a clear rule or a murky
standard, will involve close cases whose resolution is not clear. Stated
differently, reasonable minds can disagree on what is reasonable, and those
types of cases are much more likely to show up on an appellate docket. See
Sward, supra note 16, at 575 (“[W]hat is ‘reasonable’ [under the reasonable jury
test] is often in the eyes of beholder, meaning that the [reasonable jury] test
gives judges more power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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view of probability, the case dramatically altered the relationship
between trial court judge and jury with regard to disputed
questions of material fact. According to this view, the Matsushita
analysis must be applied in all types of federal civil litigation, not
just the antitrust context. Many scholars read Matsushita in this
light.138
However, this view of Matsushita is problematic on many
fronts. First, it does not adequately account for the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.139 This concern is best illustrated
by pushing the concept associated with the “What is Reasonable”
view of Matsushita to its logical extreme. This would result in
completely removing the fact-finding process from the province of
the jury (at least when there was no direct evidence on a material
issue of fact). A judge would assign a probability assessment to
any disputed fact, disregard any deviations as “unreasonable,” and
then grant summary judgment to either the plaintiff or defendant
depending on the conclusion reached by the judge. Obviously, this
result would not be desirable—nor would it be constitutional.140
No one has advocated for this view of Matsushita.
But even without such an absolute interpretation of the case,
there is at least141 tension between Matsushita and both the
138

See Miller, supra note 16, at 1068–69, nn.456–63 (listing cases applying
Matsushita outside of the antitrust context); see also Christopher R. Leslie,
Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 338 (2010)
(“[Matsushita] is frequently taught in civil procedure classes as a summary
judgment case, not an antitrust case.”). These conclusions are sometimes based
upon the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). See, e.g., Duane, supra note 10,
1569 n.174 (1995) (concluding that Eastman resolves that Matsushita is not
limited to the antitrust context); but see Levin, supra note 105, at 1631–32
(addressing the question “Does Matsushita apply outside antitrust?” and
concluding that Eastman does not resolve the issue). For a discussion of
Kodak’s description of the Matsushita decision, see infra Subsection V(B)(3).
139
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
140
See Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence,
40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 492 (1988) (“If the judge is given too much leeway in
deciding what a ‘rational’ jury would find, this may infringe on the nonmovant’s seventh amendment right to a jury trial.”).
141
Some commentators have argued that any involvement by a trial court
judge in determining the probability of a material fact is a violation of the
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Seventh Amendment’s protection of the right to a civil jury trial
and the Supreme Court’s frequent admonition that a trial judge is
not to substitute his or her opinion of the evidence for that of the
jury.142 To state the concept slightly differently, if one assumes that
a judge could not constitutionally disregard any contrasting
conclusion from the summary judgment evidence as unreasonable,
a decision to “shrink” the range of reasonable conclusions from the
evidence moves closer to that constitutional line. Not surprisingly,
the constitutionality of summary judgment was not seriously
questioned (at least in contemporary discussions) until some lower
courts (and commentators) viewed Matsushita as a green light to
apply the reasonable standard in a new, aggressive manner.143
For present purposes, it is not necessary to attempt to resolve
precisely how much constitutional latitude a judge has in making a
probability assessment from the record evidence and determining
what sorts of conclusions might be “reasonable.” It is sufficient to
establish that there is a constitutional line, and that the “What is
Reasonable?” interpretation of Matsushita either crosses this line
or, at the very least, edges towards this constitutional line. These
constitutional concerns work against the “What is Reasonable?”
interpretation of Matsushita.
In addition to the Seventh Amendment concern created by the
“What is Reasonable?” view, this view also cannot account for the
antitrust-specific language in the opinion. At various places within
the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the antitrust law context
influenced its analysis. For instance, the Court accentuated the
Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that modern summary
judgment is unconstitutional because it permits a judge to engage in a
probability analysis). This issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that, if the Supreme Court sanctioned a more
“aggressive” application of the judge’s probability inquiry at summary
judgment, this makes the potential Seventh Amendment problems more acute.
142
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)
(“[A]t the summary judgment stage the trial judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter . . . .”).
143
See Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been
A Material Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 771–75 (1988)
(examining the effect of Matsushita, but not wanting to “reinvent the wheel,” on
the constitutionality of summary judgment under the Seventh Amendment).
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antitrust nature of the dispute at the beginning of the opinion when
it framed the question to be analyzed: “This case requires that we
again consider the standard district courts must apply when
deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust
conspiracy case.”144 Similarly, the Court stated that “antitrust law
limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence in a § 1 [Sherman Antitrust Act] case.”145 Later in the
opinion, the Court explains the unique problems that can arise
when a jury concludes that a defendant has predatorily priced
when, in fact, this has not occurred: “[M]istaken inferences in
[predatory pricing] cases such as this one are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect.”146
Of course, a more refined version of the “What is
Reasonable?” interpretation accounts for the opinion’s antitrustspecific language. Under this more refined variation, trial courts
should be less willing to defer to the jury only for antitrust cases or
for particular types of antitrust cases.147 While this interpretation
accounts for antitrust-specific language, there are still problems
associated with it. The first is that—like the generic version of the
“What is Reasonable?” interpretation—the antitrust-specific
version seems to undermine Seventh Amendment principles.
The justification for the antitrust-specific version would need
to be based on the peculiar risks associated with resolving disputed
questions of facts in the antitrust context. In Matsushita, the Court
appears to offer such a justification: “mistaken inferences in

144

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576
(1986) (emphasis added).
145
Id. at 588.
146
Id. at 594. This antitrust-specific language in Matsushita has never been
accounted for by those who claim that Matsushita broadly altered the
relationship between trial judge and jury in all federal, civil suits. If the Court
intended an across-the-board redefinition of the relationship between trial judge
and jury, the antitrust-specific language in the opinion is misplaced and
unnecessary. Thus, many commentators read Matsushita as a decision which
should be confined only to the antitrust context. See supra note 16.
147
See Levin, supra note 105, at 1646–51 (exploring different
interpretations of Matsushita, including those that limit the case’s import to “all
antitrust situations”).
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[predatory pricing] cases such as this one are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect.”148 The “false positive”149 error that the Court appeared
to be concerned with in Matsushita is only remedied, however, if
trial court judges are somehow better than jurors at assessing
probability from an evidentiary record, assuming that Matsushita
was decided accorded to a probability theory. If judges are just as
likely to falsely conclude that a conspiracy existed when it did not,
the problem of false positives is not solved by telling judges to be
more stringent in characterizing different conclusions from the
record as “reasonable.”
Of course, as an empirical matter, it is entirely possible that
judges—as opposed to juries—are better equipped to assess
probability in antitrust cases. Judges, after all, are pretty smart
people and at least some of them might have more experience in
148

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594. The concern of the Court appears to be
that a mistaken litigation conclusion regarding the factual question of whether a
conspiracy existed might have the effect of deterring the type of “clean”
competition on which a functioning market is based. In other words, someone
who has a superior business model might refrain from engaging in the type of
cutthroat (but socially useful) business practices that would take market share
from a competitor, because these business practices might be mistaken for
conduct illegal under antitrust law. The assumption made by the Court in
expressing this concern is not necessarily sound. Unless the costs associated
with a mistaken conclusion regarding the existence of an antitrust conspiracy
outweigh the potential gains from delivering a superior product at a better price,
a more efficient market participant will presumably have every incentive to
maximize income by increasing market share. Granted, considering the treble
damages associated with antitrust claims, the possibility that a mistaken
conclusion could affect conduct at the margins does exist, but realistically it
seems hard to fathom that a market participant would ever refrain from activity
resulting in increased profits and market share simply because of the possibility
that they might inaccurately be adjudged as having violated antitrust law.
Nevertheless, even if the concern expressed by the Court might not have any (or
little) effect from a wealth maximization standpoint, the concern expressed by
the Court is at least valid from a wealth distribution perspective: A mistaken
factual conclusion about the existence of antitrust conspiracy does result in a
wealth transfer from a superior market participant to an inferior market
participant.
149
In the scientific community a “false positive” error is often referred to as
a “Type I error.” See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING
SCIENCE 75 (MIT Press 1997).
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antitrust matters than would a typical juror.150 Thus, it is possible
(from an empirical point of view) that shifting the probability
question from jury to judge—and this is the effect (at the margins,
at least) of the “What is Reasonable?” interpretation of
Matsushita—might improve the overall accuracy of the decisionmaking process.
Regardless, this line of thinking seems to run afoul of the
Seventh Amendment. Even if the superiority of judges over juries
in assessing probability could be empirically demonstrated—in
antitrust cases or beyond—the probability decision has been
constitutionally committed to the jury. As Professor Suja Thomas
has emphatically stated, “[The Seventh Amendment] was the
choice of the founders. Period. Any attempt to merge efficiency
and the jury ignores the decision that the founders made—to have
a jury trial right.”151 For better or worse, the Seventh Amendment
gives juries the power to determine disputed questions of fact in a
litigation context. Even if the policy behind the Seventh
Amendment was solely attributed to a belief that juries are more
accurate than judges in assigning probabilities to disputed
questions of material fact,152 empirically demonstrating the
invalidity of this assumption does not justify a deviation from this
constitutional decision. Thus, the same Seventh Amendment
concerns that worked against the generic “What is Reasonable?”
150

This presumption will not always be valid, or course. A business
executive sitting on a jury is probably better suited to determine the probability
that an illegal antitrust conspiracy existed than is the typical federal court judge.
151
Suja A. Thomas, Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J.499, 512–13 (2012).
152
It seems relatively clear that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
is based on more than just the accuracy of jury decisions regarding material
questions of fact. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 670–71 (1973) (discussing the
antifederalists’ arguments in favor of Seventh Amendment, which included the
“protection of debtor defendants[,] the frustration of unwise legislation . . . the
vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government[,]
and the protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges”); see
also Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the
Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1013, 1013, 1017–18 (1994) (discussing the historical importance of the Seventh
Amendment).
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probability reading of Matsushita also undermine the more limited
antitrust-only version of this probability theory.
In addition to the Seventh Amendment concern, the anti-trust
specific version is contrary to the transsubstantive nature of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules establish the
procedural rules that govern civil litigation in federal courts.153 It is
well established that these procedural rules are to apply uniformly
to all different types of substantive disputes,154 with a few
exceptions to this transsubstantive principle specifically delineated
Of course, these
within the text of various rules.155
transsubstantive rules can be altered by positive law. This
occurred, for instance, in the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”).156 In the PLRA, Congress imposed a procedural
requirement, applicable to suits filed by prisoners “with respect to
prison conditions,” that requires a prisoner plaintiff to exhaust
potential administrative remedies within the prison system before
filing suit in federal court.157 No such exhaustion requirement
exists within the Federal Rules.158
Despite Matsushita’s specific reliance on antitrust law, there is
no antitrust statute that indicates a Congressional intent to alter the
usual relationship—as established by the Federal Rules—between
the judge and jury with regard to disputed questions of fact.
Absent specific text indicating an intent to alter the standard
approach contained within the Rules, the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected attempts by lower courts to surmise this intent
based on policy concerns: “[C]ourts should generally not depart
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of

153

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .”).
154
Id.
155
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (establishing a different pleading standard for
certain types of cases).
156
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat.
1321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1996)).
157
Id.
158
See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002) (observing that, for
plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not generally required before filing suit in federal court).
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perceived policy concerns.”159 Therefore, an antitrust-specific
version would be contrary to the transsubstantive nature of the
Federal Rules.
Of course, this is not to say that the application of the Federal
Rules to a particular dispute will always be blind to the substantive
law involved in the litigation. This is obvious if one considers Rule
8, which addresses whether a party has properly pleaded a claim
for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.160 A judge applying
the standard from Rule 8—a “short and plain statement of the
claim”161—cannot do so without considering the substantive law
implicated by the dispute. If the complaint alleges facts that are
inconsistent with recovery under the substantive law, the complaint
must be dismissed. This conclusion is reached, however, only by
considering how the procedural standard of Rule 8 applies to the
substantive law implicated by the dispute.162 A judge cannot know
whether the plaintiff pleaded a “short and plain statement of the
claim” unless the judge knows the legal claim involved in the
dispute.
The notion that the application of the Federal Rules will
sometimes be informed by the substantive law at stake cannot
explain the Matsushita Court’s reference to antitrust law, however,
at least if Matsushita was decided under a probability theory. The
159

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 200 (2007); see also id. at 214 (“We think
that the PLRA’s screening requirement does not-explicitly or implicitly-justify
deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by
the PLRA itself.”). This concept that the procedures established under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be changed without clear statutory
language is a spin on the familiar principle that the Rules Enabling Act does not
alter substantive rights. If the question is one of procedure, the Federal Rules
offer a default solution from which a deviation can be justified only with clear
Congressional intent.
160
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
161
Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
162
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests,
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 830 (2010) (explaining that a judge
determining whether a complaint complies with Rule 8 must determine whether
“any legal claim exists that would be consistent” with the factual allegations of
the complaint).
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probability issue relates to the likely existence of facts. Resolving
who and how the existence of these facts will be determined is a
legal question that is addressed in Rule 56. Resolving this legal
issue—as opposed to the legal issue addressed in Rule 8—does not
require a reference to the underlying substantive law. Disputed
questions of fact must be resolved for all types of federal litigation;
in light of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules, the
assumption should be that Rule 56 provides a uniform approach to
resolving disputed questions of fact in federal litigation, absent
specific Congressional guidance to the contrary. The antitrustspecific version of the “What is Reasonable?” probability theory of
Matsushita is based on the assumption that, because judges are
better at resolving disputed questions of fact in the antitrust
context, a judge should be less willing to accept differing factual
perspectives on the record as “reasonable.” The transsubstantive
nature of the Rules, however, seems to preclude this sort of pickand-choose approach. There is no satisfactory justification for a
unique legal approach to resolving disputed question of antitrust
facts without some clear signal that the transsubstantive nature of
the Rules is inoperative; no such signal exists in the backdrop to
Matsushita.
To summarize, any interpretation of Matsushita that is based
on the assumption that the Court’s decision depended upon a
probability analysis results in grave problems. The notion that
Matsushita derived from the Justices’ individual perspectives that
there was little probability that the alleged conspiracy had actually
occurred (the “No Chance!” interpretation) is inconsistent with the
language of the opinion. This language confirms that the Court was
interested in the standard applicable to summary judgment rather
than the application of that standard to a particular evidentiary
record.
The “What is Reasonable?” interpretation of Matsushita
improves upon the “No Chance!” interpretation by acknowledging
that the Court was interested in the summary judgment standard
rather than its application. Under the “What is Reasonable?”
interpretation, the Court’s decision changed the summary judgment
standard by directing lower courts to be less tolerant in defining
the range of probability conclusions from the record evidence that
qualify as reasonable. Some have, and continue, to interpret
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Matsushita in this manner, but this view results in tension—if not
an outright violation—of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial.
Moreover, the “What is Reasonable?” view cannot account for
the language that seems to place much emphasis on the antitrust
nature of the dispute. This antitrust-specific language can be
accounted for under a more refined version of the “What is
Reasonable?” interpretation. Under this more limited
interpretation, the Court believed that judges should be more
reluctant to allow for reasonable disagreements regarding
probability only when a case involves antitrust law or perhaps a
specific issue within antitrust law. This variation of the “What is
Reasonable?” view depends on the premise that, at least for
antitrust cases, judges are more capable than juries in assessing the
probability of the material facts in dispute. Here again, though,
this view seems to run afoul of the Seventh Amendment’s
commitment to jury decision making with regard to disputed
questions of material fact: even if judges are better at assessing
probability in this specific context, this truth would not seem to
justify a deviation from principles of the Seventh Amendment.
Moreover, the antitrust-only version of the “What is Reasonable?”
view of Matsushita seems to violate the transsubstantive principle
of the Rules.
Thus, despite the language in Matsushita that suggests that the
Court’s decision rested on a probability analysis, multiple
problems arise under this view. All of the problems are resolved,
however, by a confidence reading of the case.
B. The Confidence Reading of Matsushita
In the same manner in which a confidence understanding
resolves the “paradox” of the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals, a confidence reading of Matsushita also resolves the
many “paradoxes” that arise under a probability reading of the
case. Under a confidence reading of Matsushita, summary
judgment was necessary because an insufficient degree of
confidence could be had in any probability assessment from the
minimal circumstantial evidence in that case. Because of the state
of the record in Matsushita, any conclusion regarding
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probability—by either the judge or the jury—was going to be a
rough guess based on incomplete information.
The only other commentator to suggest anything akin to a
confidence reading of Matsushita is Daniel Collins, in a 1988
student note in the Stanford Law Review.163 Although Collins does
not use the “confidence” terminology employed in this Article and
by others such as Professor Neil Cohen,164 he does posit that an
“alternate reading”165 of Matsushita would emphasize the notion
that “permitting certain circumstantial inferences may have the
effect of deterring perfectly legitimate conduct that the antitrust
laws seek to protect.”166 This line of thinking focuses on the risk of
false positives and the adequacy of information and not on the
probability that an actual conspiracy occurred. In addition, Collins
analogizes this interpretation of Matsushita to Professor Jonathan
Cohen’s gatecrasher hypothetical.167 The confidence principle
drives Collins’s note, even if the principle is not explicitly
identified as such.168
Collins does very little, however, to explain why this proposed
interpretation of Matsushita is correct. And, in his defense, Collins
might not have perceived the need to do so: when Collins wrote his
student note in 1988, he could not have anticipated that the
interpretation of Matsushita he was considering would be so
important. The summary judgment “revolution” inspired by a
probability reading of Matsushita had not yet occurred, and the
plausibility standard of Twombly (which Matsushita, correctly
understood, elucidates) was decades down the road.
163

Daniel Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence,
40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 492 (1988).
164
See Cohen, supra note 38, at 399 (explaining the concept and term).
165
Collins, supra note 140, at 507.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 511–12.
168
Courts and commentators have occasionally cited Collins’s note, but
unfortunately not for his primary thesis—his “alternate reading” of Matsushita.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1209 n.9 (1988); Paul W. Mollica,
Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 153 n.69
(2000) (both citing Collins’s article for generic points but neither discussing his
“alternate reading” of Matsushita).
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In any event, I aim to pick up where Collins left off in his
impressive note: I wish to not only explain a confidence
interpretation of Matsushita, but to demonstrate why this
interpretation is correct. The remainder of this section will be
devoted to the eight reasons why Matsushita should be read
according to a confidence analysis.
1. Different Fixes for Different Problems
Before proceeding to a discussion of the superiority of a
confidence reading of Matsushita, a few additional remarks
regarding the distinction between probability and confidence are
warranted.
The probability interpretations of Matsushita discussed above
all proceed along the following analytical path: because a jury
might make an erroneous decision with regard to probability, this
decision-making process should be shifted to judges. By shifting
the probability question from juries to judges, the problem of
“false positives” identified in Matsushita is avoided because judges
are presumably superior to juries in performing a probability
analysis.
A confidence reading of Matsushita, however, proceeds along
a dramatically different path. Under a confidence analysis, the
problem is not with the jury’s ability to accurately perform a
probability analysis. Rather, the problem is that the “highly
circumstantial” nature of the record means that any probability
assessment from that record—regardless of who is performing this
probability analysis—will be impaired. The confidence problem
thus requires a different “fix” than the probability problem. The
probability problem is the jury’s accurateness is assessing
probability; the fix is to shift probability decision making from the
jury towards the judge. The confidence problem, however, is with
the incomplete state of the record; the fix here is to prevent a
probability analysis from even occurring. If the problem is the
inadequate quantity of evidence in the record (confidence), shifting
decision-making power from the jury to the judge does not address
the problem.
This concept can be deftly demonstrated by returning to the
blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals. Recall that in each
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hypothetical a purely probabilistic view seemed to compel a
victory for the plaintiff; the statistical, circumstantial evidence
indicated that the material fact in dispute had occurred. Figure D
depicts these two cases from a probability perspective:
Figure D

0

50 50.1

Gatecrasher

80

100

Blue Bus

Preponderance
of the Evidence
Notice that for each of these hypotheticals, the probability
assessment will be exactly the same for either a jury at trial or a
judge at summary judgment. A jury forced to give an assessment
of probability from the record evidence would have to conclude
that the material fact in dispute was 80% probable in the blue bus
hypothetical and 50.1% probable in the gatecrasher hypothetical. A
judge’s assessment of probability at summary judgment is different
than a jury’s assessment of probability at trial; a judge is only to
determine whether a jury could reasonably come to a probability
conclusion for either side. This analysis has been depicted in this
Article as a range or continuum of reasonable probability
conclusions from the evidence. For the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals, however, there is only one reasonable probability
conclusion from the evidence: 80% in the blue bus hypothetical
and 50.1% in the gatecrasher hypothetical. Thus, the range of
reasonable probability conclusions for the judge at summary
judgment shrinks to the exact same point estimate as the jury’s
assessment of probability at trial. Indeed, that is the beauty of these
hypotheticals: by removing any dispute as to the probability
required from the record evidence, these hypotheticals show that
another concept is at play.
Consider, then, how shifting decision-making power from jury
to judge is completely ineffective at resolving the “problem” if the
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problem is the inadequate quantity of evidence. The blue bus and
gatecrashers hypotheticals demonstrate that even if the probability
determination is completely shifted from jury to judge, the judge
will still get the “wrong” answer through a probability analysis. In
the hypotheticals, the range of reasonable probability conclusions
was nonexistent, meaning that the judge’s summary judgment
conclusion pursuant to the reasonable jury standard would suggest
an award of summary judgment for the plaintiff. Yet, a judge
performing a probability analysis would reach the same “incorrect”
result as a jury forced to make a probability conclusion at trial.
Only by performing a confidence analysis can the judge reach the
“right” result in the hypotheticals, which is to award summary
judgment to the defendant. This confidence approach completely
precludes a probability analysis from ever being performed, by
judge or jury.
Of course, characterizing Matsushita as deriving from
probability or confidence principles is more difficult than
characterizing the blue bus and gatecrashers hypotheticals as such.
In the hypotheticals, a probability analysis means victory for the
plaintiff; only a confidence analysis can explain a summary
judgment for the defendant. In Matsushita, however, the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant could have been the
result of either a probability analysis or a confidence analysis;
unlike the hypotheticals, a precise and agreed-upon determination
of the probability of the alleged conspiracy in Matsushita is simply
not feasible. In attempting to make this determination regarding the
true nature of the decision in Matsushita, however, it is helpful to
remember that each analysis derives from a different problem: if
the problem in Matsushita was jury decision making, the decision
was based on a probability analysis. If the problem in Matsushita
was the incomplete state of the record, the decision was based on a
confidence analysis.
2. Matsushita Involves a Legal Standard
So, was confidence—rather than probability—the impetus for
the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita? Earlier, I compared
Matsushita to a Rubik’s Cube. Under a confidence understanding
of the case, most of the sides of this Rubik’s Cube start to align
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and the problems that arise under a probability view of the case
subside. First, recall that the “No Chance!” probability reading of
Matsushita could not account for the language in the opinion
strongly suggesting that the issue before the Court involved the
standard for summary judgment rather than its application to a
particular summary judgment record.169 A confidence reading of
Matsushita comports with the language in the opinion indicating
that the issue before the Supreme Court was the “standard district
courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary
judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case.”170 A confidence inquiry
requires a judge to make a legal determination as to whether there
is an acceptable amount of evidence to proceed to a probability
analysis. The nature of this analysis is explored in more depth in
Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury Standard,171
This analysis essentially requires judges to ask two policy
questions: (1) of the universe of available evidence on the disputed
question of material fact, how much exists in the current summary
judgment record?; and (2) what are the potential negative
consequences of allowing the case to proceed to a jury for a
probability assessment from this record? If these are the questions
that the Court was wrestling with in Matsushita, it makes sense
that the Court would characterize this inquiry as a legal one
involving the standard for summary judgment. This type of inquiry
does not involve the probable truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.
3. Antitrust Law and Eastman Kodak
A confidence reading explains the Court’s emphasis on
antitrust law when it determined that summary judgment was
appropriate. Recall the various passages within Matsushita that
emphasize the antitrust context of the case, such as the following:
“[M]istaken inferences in [predatory pricing] cases such as this one
are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
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See supra subsection V(A)(1).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Radio Zenith Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576
(1986) (emphasis added).
171
Meier, supra note 1.
170

PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA

125

antitrust laws are designed to protect.”172 This type of policy
inquiry is fully consistent with—indeed, it is required by—a
confidence analysis.
A confidence analysis requires a judge to make a policy
decision concerning the consequences of allowing a jury to make a
probability assessment from the evidence. Commentators have
offered a host of policy considerations that might inform this
inquiry. For instance, Professor Charles Nesson posits that it is
critical that the general public view jury trials as legitimate, and
that allowing cases to proceed to a jury for a probability analysis,
despite a meager record, might undermine the credibility of the
entire system.173 Similarly, Professor Adrian A.S. Zuckerman
submits that a judge must be concerned with protecting the
integrity of the system and that allowing cases with a scant
summary judgment record to proceed to trial might undermine the
integrity of the system.174 Professor Zuckerman suggests that the
public will reject civil verdicts in which the defendant is seemingly
judged not on his or her individual actions but instead on
belonging to a certain group (for example, owning blue busses)
that statistically suggests that the defendant is liable.175 Professor
Richard Lempert focuses on another component of the confidence
inquiry, arguing that a judge should consider, as part of a
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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or The Events? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1379 (1985) (citing
cases) (“Although the defendant probably caused the plaintiff’s injury, the
factfinder cannot reach a conclusion that the public will accept as a statement
about what happened. . . . Because the judicial system strives to project an
acceptable account about what happened, then, the plaintiff’s evidence is
insufficient, notwithstanding the high probability of its accuracy.”).
174
See Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487,
499 (1986) (stating that confidence in verdicts is “crucial to public respect for
judicial adjudication”).
175
See id. (“Judgments based on naked statistical distributions openly
acknowledge that the individual defendant may well belong to the innocent
minority, and therefore undermine the citizen’s confidence that the legal system
will protect him from mistaken conviction of crime or mistaken imposition of
liability.”).
173
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confidence analysis, the incentive of plaintiffs176 to produce more
specific evidence so as to survive summary judgment.177
The policy concerns that these authors identify have universal
application to every type of case, but there is no reason that policy
concerns unique to a particular body of law might not also be
considered. This is precisely what occurred in Matsushita when the
Court stated that “mistaken inferences in [predatory pricing] cases
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”178 The
Matsushita Court was concerned about the policy effect of
allowing a jury to infer the existence of an illegal antitrust
conspiracy solely from evidence that, absent an agreement, was not
only legal but desirable.179
The antitrust-specific concerns that drove the Court in
Matsushita, however, were not present in the Court’s subsequent
antitrust case of Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,
Inc.,180 which explains why the Court reached a different
conclusion regarding summary judgment in Kodak than in
176

As I explain in Probability, Confidence, and the Reasonable Jury
Standard, the party with the burden of persuasion at trial will be the party who
suffers when a court concludes, pursuant to a confidence analysis, that the
evidence is insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Meier, supra note 1.
177
See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the
Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 460 (1986) (discussing the incentive on
plaintiffs to come forward with more evidence).
178
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986).
179
This policy concern does not depend on the probability that an
agreement exists in a particular case. Rather, the concern is that a market
participant will recognize that a decision based only on circumstantial evidence
involves a high margin of error and that, inevitably, mistakes in future cases—
including “false positive” results in which a conspiracy is incorrectly determined
to exist—will preclude otherwise desirable market conduct. See Mark Anderson
& Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive
Error, 20 CORN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2010) (“Recognizing ex ante the
danger of incurring discovery expenses and possible liability, defendants are
motivated to keep well short of the line that separates legal from illegal conduct.
In eschewing legal conduct that may give rise to litigation, defendants dumbdown their conduct to their own, and society’s, detriment. That, too, is a cost of
false positive error.”).
180
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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Matsushita. In Kodak, the Court considered the plaintiffs’ claim
that Kodak had tied its business of servicing Kodak machines to
Kodak’s business of selling parts for its machines.181 For Kodak to
be liable on this claim, it must have had “appreciable economic
power” or “market power” in the parts market.182 The Supreme
Court treated the question of whether Kodak had market power in
the parts market as a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.183
Kodak argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because it
did not have market power in the equipment market and thus could
not have market power in the parts market.184
The Kodak case thus bears a loose resemblance to Matsushita;
in both cases the defendant argued that the circumstantial evidence
in the summary judgment record compelled a decision—before
trial—for the defendant. The Court noted, however, that the “false
positive” concerns from Matsushita were not as acute in Kodak
because the Kodak plaintiffs—unlike the Matsushita plaintiffs—
were not asking the jury to infer illegal behavior from conduct that
was both legal and desirable.185 Thus, Kodak and Matsushita
demonstrate that the policy concerns that inform the confidence
inquiry will not necessarily be uniform across cases, even those
involving the same general subject matter.186
181

Id. at 454–55.
Id. at 464.
183
Id. at 469–79 (analyzing the question of market power as a factual
issue); but see William W. Schwarzer, Making the Rule of Reason Analysis
More Manageable, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 234 (1988) (“[I]n many cases
[determination of the relevant market] is susceptible to decision on summary
judgment; it is not a jury question at all.”).
184
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464–66.
185
Id. at 478 (“Nor are we persuaded by Kodak’s contention that it is
entitled to a legal presumption on the lack of market power because, as in
Matsushita, there is a significant risk of deterring procompetitive conduct.”).
186
Interpreting Matsushita as having been decided according to a
confidence analysis also provides context to the Kodak Court’s description of
the Matsushita decision. In Kodak, the Court said that “[t]he Court’s
requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs’ claims make economic sense did
not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in
antitrust cases.” Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468. Linguistically speaking, this sentence
is a nightmare, and it is difficult to determine precisely what the Court meant by
this statement. Some have interpreted this comment as requiring that the
182
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4. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial

A confidence reading also avoids the Seventh Amendment
issues that plague the probability reading. This concept is explored
in greater depth in my Article “Probability, Confidence, and the
Constitutionality of Summary Judgment.”187 To briefly summarize,
while there are serious Seventh Amendment concerns in shifting
the probability analysis away from the jury and toward the
judge,188 the historical use of a confidence analysis as part of the
involuntary nonsuit confirms that there is no constitutional
problem when a judge determines that there is an inadequate
amount of evidence from which to conduct a probability
analysis.189 When this occurs, the judge has not addressed the
probability of the material facts to the litigation but simply
determined, as a matter of law, that no probability analysis will
occur. There is a longstanding history of courts concluding that
certain evidence is not sufficient—as a matter of policy rather than
probability—to warrant submission to a jury for a probability
determination.190 At the time the Seventh Amendment was
adopted in 1791, English courts could enter an involuntary nonsuit
against a plaintiff, before trial, when that plaintiff had failed to
analysis of Matsushita be applied outside the antitrust context. See, e.g., Duane,
supra note 10, at 1569 n.174 (1995) (concluding that [Kodak] resolves that
Matsushita is not limited to the antitrust context). This interpretation is difficult
to square with the antitrust-specific language in the opinion—at least if
Matsushita was decided according to a probability analysis. If, however,
Matsushita was decided according to a confidence analysis, the Kodak Court’s
characterization of Matsushita makes sense. Matsushita was not decided
according to an analysis that imposed a special burden in antitrust cases. Rather,
a confidence analysis is always part of a judge’s inquiry at the summary
judgment stage, be it an antitrust case or another type of case. This confidence
analysis, however, can be informed by policy concerns that are unique to a
particular subject matter.
187
See generally Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the
Constitutionality of Summary Judgment. (forthcoming) (concluding that no
Seventh Amendment violation occurs when summary judgment is entered
pursuant to a confidence analysis).
188
See id.
189
See id.
190
See id.
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assemble an adequate record from which the jury could reach a
probability determination.191
5. The Transsubstantive Nature of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
A confidence reading of Matsushita also reconciles the case
with the transsubstantive approach of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Recall that, under a probability reading of Matsushita,
the Court’s emphasis on the antitrust setting of the case seems to
run afoul of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules.192 A
confidence reading of Matsushita, however, explains how the
Court could weigh antitrust-specific considerations yet stay true to
the Federal Rules’ transubstantive approach.193 A confidence
analysis requires a judge to ask the same question in every case: is
there an adequate amount of evidence to allow this case to proceed
to a jury for a probability determination?
The application of this transsubstantive standard might require
a judge to consider the particular substantive law involved in the
case. Thus, in Matsushita, the Court considered the negative
consequences of allowing an antitrust plaintiff to proceed to a jury
probability determination based on circumstantial evidence of legal
(and desirable) behavior that was also probative of illegal
conduct.194 That a procedure rule might be applied differently for
different types of cases, however, is fully consonant with the
transsubstantive ideals of the Federal Rules. This is obvious when
one considers the pleading standard of Rule 8. Obviously, a judge
cannot know whether a plaintiff has pled a claim under Rule 8
without considering the substantive law involved.195 Yet no one
191

See id.
See supra Subsection V(A)(2).
193
Of course, this inquiry begs an additional question: Even if the
Matsushita Court was, in reality, applying a confidence analysis to affirm the
defendants’ summary judgment, does Rule 56 permit judges to engage in this
type of inquiry? I plan to address this question in future scholarship.
194
See supra notes 165–80.
195
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 162, at 830 (explaining that a judge
determining whether a complaint complies with Rule 8 must determine whether
“any legal claim exists that would be consistent” with the factual allegations of
192
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would contend that Rule 8 is inconsistent with the transsubstantive
nature of the Federal Rules.196 Simply put, the application of
transsubstantive rules will often depend on the subject matter
context of the case. Under a confidence reading of Matsushita,
then, the Court’s consideration of antitrust-specific considerations
was completely consistent with the transsubstantive approach
contained in the Federal Rules.
6. The Probability Language in Matsushita and
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
In light of the numerous advantages to a confidence reading of
Matsushita, the final step is to determine whether this
understanding of the case is consistent with the language of the
opinion. As mentioned previously, there are concededly some
portions of the Matsushita opinion that suggest that the Court was
concerned with probability rather than confidence.197 The best
reading of Matsushita, however, is that this probability language
was actually dicta and that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient
regardless of probability.
The most direct language in this regard is found in a
concluding footnote toward the end of the Court’s opinion. The
footnote in question follows this textual sentence: “[i]n sum, in
light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither
petitioners’ pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese
market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribution in
the American market, suffice to create a ‘genuine issue for
trial.’”198 After this sentence, the Court states the following in a
footnote: “We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible
reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a
triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. SprayRite Service Corp. establishes that conduct that is as consistent
the complaint).
196
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909, 977 (1987) (describing the transsubstantive objectives behind
Rule 8).
197
See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
198
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597
(1986).
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with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”199 This
footnote is imperative to understanding the Court’s thought process
in Matsushita.200 The footnote suggests that, despite the attention
the Court gives to the probability issue (which the Court loosely
characterizes as the “motive” question), the plaintiffs’ evidence did
not meet the burden of production even if the conspiracy alleged by
the plaintiffs was more straightforward and thus more believable.
To understand this point, first consider the sentence in the text
of the Court’s opinion preceding the footnote. The sentence in the
text summarizes the circumstantial evidence available in the case.
It lists the circumstantial evidence favoring the defendant,201 which
the Court calls the “rationale motive” issue as a shorthand way to
express the notion that the plaintiffs’ theory of predatory pricing
involves a risky, long-term scheme attacking a well-established
American company on its home turf.202 The Court then lists the
circumstantial evidence relied on by the plaintiff: that the
defendants have cooperated in other ways in both the Japanese and
American markets, including agreements (that are not alone
actionable) regarding prices in Japan and American.203 The textual
sentence concludes that this list of evidence does not create a
triable issue of fact under Rule 56.204
The footnote following this sentence in the text, however,
posits that even if the circumstantial evidence regarding the
defendants’ “motives” was removed from the case, the plaintiffs’
evidence might still be insufficient to warrant submission to the
jury. “Ambiguous conduct,” says the Court in the footnote, “does
not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”205
199

Id. at 597 n.21.
I am not alone in assigning significance to this footnote. For extensive
discussions the importance of footnote 21 of the Matsushita opinion, see Levin,
supra note 105, at 1646–47; Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case:
Tightened Concepts of Conspiracy and Predation, 8 CARD. L. REV. 1121, 1132–
33 (1987); David F. Shores, supra note 122, at 312–13.
201
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
202
See supra text accompanying notes 111–17.
203
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 597 n.21.
200
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The Court supports this conclusion with a citation to the Monsanto
Co. decision.206 An inspection of the Monsanto decision reveals
that the plaintiff’s evidence in that case was “ambiguous” in the
exact same manner as the evidence involved in Matsushita, and
that the summary judgment in Monsanto was clearly based on a
confidence analysis.
The Monsanto207 case dealt with essentially the same question
raised in Matsushita: when does an antitrust plaintiff have
sufficient evidence to meet her burden of production and get to the
jury on the question of whether the defendant engaged in an illegal
conspiracy?208 The Monsanto case implicated this question in the
context of vertical price-fixing agreements (as opposed to the
predatory pricing context involved in Matsushita).209 The plaintiff
in the Monsanto litigation had been terminated in its capacity as a
distributor of herbicide products manufactured by the defendants in
that case.210 The defendants claimed that the termination occurred
because the plaintiff failed “to hire trained salesmen and promote
sales to dealers.”211 The plaintiff, however, argued that its
termination was based on a failure to comply with a pricing
scheme developed as part of an agreement between defendants and
some of defendants’ other distributors.212 A manufacturer can
independently establish a price that its distributors must comply
with in order to remain a distributor,213 but it is a violation of
antitrust law for this price to be established through an agreement
between the manufacturer and (at least some) distributors.214
206

Id.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
208
Compare id. at 755 (considering what standard of proof a plaintiff must
meet in an antitrust vertical price-fixing conspiracy case), with Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 576 (considering what standard of proof a plaintiff must meet in an
antitrust conspiracy to price-fix case).
209
Compare Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 755 (framing the conspiracy issue in
the context of vertical price fixing), with Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584–585
(framing the conspiracy issue in the context of predatory pricing).
210
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 757.
211
Id. at 752.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 760–61.
214
Id.
207
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In Monsanto, the district court concluded that a jury
determination was necessary to resolve whether the plaintiff had
been terminated as a distributor because of its failure to comply
with a pricing scheme established through a conspiracy.215 The
plaintiff’s evidence, as summarized by the Supreme Court in
Monsanto, consisted of essentially two bits of evidence. First,
according to the Court, there was “substantial direct evidence of
agreements to maintain prices.”216 Second, there was
circumstantial evidence that an agreement existed (and that the
plaintiff had been fired for failing to comply with the terms of this
agreement).217 This circumstantial evidence consisted of
complaints filed by other distributors about the plaintiff’s low
prices for the defendants’ products.218
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court in the Monsanto litigation, agreeing
that the plaintiff’s burden of production had been satisfied and that
a jury resolution was necessary.219 More specifically, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence was
alone sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of production and
thus reach the jury.220 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit on the question of whether the circumstantial evidence put
forward by the plaintiff was, alone, sufficient to get the plaintiff to
the jury.221 As the Court explained:
[I]t is of considerable importance that independent
action by the manufacturer . . . be distinguished
from price-fixing agreement, since under present
law the latter are subject to per se treatment and
treble damages. On a claim of concerted pricefixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence
sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there
was such an agreement. If an inference of such an
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 758.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 759.
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agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous
evidence, there is a considerable danger that the
[distinction made in the law between independent
action and illegal conspiracy] will be seriously
eroded.222
In this language from Monsanto, the Court is clearly
articulating the policy reasons why circumstantial evidence might
not be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of production in an
antitrust case. In short, there is significant danger in allowing a
jury to find a defendant liable when the evidence produced
involves a high margin of error and the consequences from an
erroneous factual decision are serious. According to the Court in
Monsanto, the problem with relying solely on circumstantial
evidence in proving an antitrust conspiracy is not with the
probative value of the evidence under a probability analysis:
“We do not suggest that [the plaintiff’s
circumstantial evidence] has no probative value at
all, but only that the burden remains on the antitrust
plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient
to support a finding of unlawful contract,
combination, or conspiracy.”223
Although the Court in Monsanto does not use the term
“confidence” in its opinion, it is relatively clear that this concept of
sufficiency of information guided the Court’s decision. According
to the Monsanto Court, the problem with relying solely on
circumstantial evidence to prove an antitrust conspiracy is not that
a person would be unreasonable in concluding that the
circumstantial evidence slightly favored a conclusion that a
conspiracy exists. Instead, the problem is that the evidence is
“highly ambiguous.”224 In other words, there is a high margin of
error associated with the evidence—similar to a poorly conducted
public opinion poll. And, because the consequences of an
222

Id. at 763.
Id. at 764 n.8 (emphasis added). This requirement of producing
additional evidence of an antitrust violation is sometimes referred to as the “plus
factor” requirement. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal
Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CAL. L. REV. 683, 749–52 (2011)
(discussing ‘plus factors’).
224
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
223

PROBABILITY, CONFIDENCE, AND MATSUSHITA

135

erroneous decision are severe, it is better that a probability analysis
not be performed (by either the judge or the jury).
The exact same can be said about the circumstantial evidence
the plaintiffs relied on in Matsushita. The plaintiffs’ evidence
demonstrated that an agreement among the defendants to price
predatorily was a possible explanation for the defendants’ low
prices. The plaintiffs’ evidence also showed that the defendants
had worked together to coordinate business activities on different
issues, including the establishment of price floors in Japan.225 In
this regard, the evidence was “probative” in the same manner that
the Monsanto evidence was probative. But, it was also
“ambiguous” because neither case involved a “smoking gun” bit of
evidence on the disputed, material fact. Thus, any conclusion
drawn from the evidence (either that a conspiracy did, or did not,
exist) would necessarily involve a high margin of error and little
confidence that the probability assessment was accurate.
In attempting to figure out the true basis of Matsushita, the
Court’s multitude of references to Monsanto is telling.226 The
Monsanto decision was clearly based on a confidence analysis
rather than a probability analysis, and the Court in Monsanto did a
relatively good job of articulating this somewhat elusive concept.
The Matsushita opinion is, admittedly, not as clear or eloquent in
describing the confidence concept as the true basis for summary
judgment in that case. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the
difficult problem it was wrestling with in Matsushita was
conceptually identical to the problem in Monsanto.
The Matsushita Court’s difficulty in verbalizing the confidence
concept is analogous to what occurred in Houchens, discussed
above. In fact, in one passage within Matsushita, the Court falls
back on language similar to the “equal inferences rule” that the
Houchens court relied on: “[C]onduct that is as consistent with
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”227 Earlier,
in analyzing the Houchens case (which clearly involved an
225

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–
97 (1986).
226
See id. at 588, 597–98.
227
Id. at 597 n.21.
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application of the confidence principle), I characterized the “equal
inferences” language in that case as the product of a judge that
intuitively understands the confidence concept but mangles the
explanation of this tricky concept.228 The “equal inferences”-type
language in Matsushita should be understood in the same manner.
Because the probative value of the plaintiffs’ evidence of a
conspiracy could legitimately be seen as unpersuasive,
communicating the confidence concept in Matsushita was even
more challenging. Recall that one of the benefits of the blue bus
and gatecrasher hypotheticals is that these hypotheticals zero in
(with pinpoint accuracy) on the paradox of a judge entering
judgment against a plaintiff when the only available evidence
suggests that the plaintiff’s version of the contested, material facts
is most likely true.
The Matsushita litigation (and most other real—as opposed to
hypothetical—cases) does not replicate the same circumstances
that made the paradox in the blue bus and gatecrasher
hypotheticals so explicit. It is not clear in Matsushita, as it was in
the blue bus and gatecrasher hypotheticals, that a probability
analysis based solely on the available record evidence would favor
the plaintiffs. Rather, one could legitimately look at the record
evidence in Matsushita and conclude that the enormous, and
complicated, predatory pricing scheme asserted by the plaintiffs
was unlikely. This factor complicated the elucidation of the
confidence principle in Matsushita. Because the confidence issue
was not as conspicuously thrust to the forefront as it was in the
hypotheticals or even in Houchens, it is perhaps not surprising that
the Court might struggle in expressing this tricky concept.229 There
228

See supra Section IV.
Part of the problem might inhere in the limitations of the English
language. See Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty: Explaining the
Possible Sources of Error in Inferences, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1540
(2001) (“The descriptive function of a theory of uncertainty is less obvious from
the grammar of English.”). As someone who has struggled to write clearly
about the confidence concept using primarily the English language (rather than
mathematical formulas), I would forcefully concur with Professor Walker’s
assertion. Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LOGICO-TRACTATUS PHILOSPHICUS 5.6
(“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”). In any event, I am
not as critical as others about the mathematical limitations of most of within the
229
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is a reason that the hypotheticals are thought to be a jurisprudential
“paradox,” and that is because the answer to this paradox is not an
easy one for lawyers (as opposed to mathematicians) to
comprehend.
Therefore, it is perhaps not completely surprising in a case
such as Matsushita, where there is both a lack of record evidence
on a material issue of fact and where a probability analysis of that
record evidence could be viewed as favoring the defendant, that
the Court would allow some probability language to creep into the
opinion even though the true basis for the decision was a
confidence analysis.
7. Why Matsushita Helps Defendants and Hurts
Plaintiffs
There is a general consensus that the summary judgment
standard applied by the Court in Matsushita helps defendants but
not plaintiffs. This conclusion makes sense if Matsushita was
decided according to a confidence analysis but not if Matsushita
was decided according to a probability analysis.
Under a probability reading of Matsushita, the allocation of
authority with regard to disputed questions of fact was shifted from
the jury to the judge. There is no reason, however, why this shift
would help defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. Under a
probability analysis, a judge determines whether a jury would be
reasonable in resolving the disputed question of fact, and there is
no logical reason as to why this standard cannot work for plaintiffs
as well as against plaintiffs.230 This analysis is neutral between
plaintiffs and defendants. If a jury would be unreasonable in
legal profession. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE DECLINE OF LAW AS AN
AUTONOMOUS DISCIPLINE: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 778 (1987)
(discussing the “prevalent (and disgraceful) math-block that afflicts the legal
profession”). Perhaps this is because I do not consider myself as exempt from
the affliction that Judge Posner laments. Cf. Peter Tillers, Trial by
Mathematics—Reconsidered, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 173 (2011)
(“[T]he day may yet come when rigorous formal argument about evidence,
factual inference and factual proof looks and feels warm and friendly to ordinary
and mathematically illiterate people such as me.”).
230
But see supra note 226.
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resolving the facts either way, summary judgment is appropriate.
Thus, if Matsushita was decided according to a probability
analysis, the increased power of judges regarding the probability of
disputed facts would theoretically result in an equal number of
additional pre-verdict judgments for both the plaintiff and the
defendant.231
But this, of course, is not how Matsushita has been interpreted.
Instead, Matsushita is viewed as a case that benefits defendants
because it makes it more likely that a judge will grant a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.232 This makes perfect
sense if Matsushita was decided pursuant to a confidence analysis,
because a confidence analysis always works against the party with
the burden of production. A party with the burden of production
has the burden of assembling an adequate amount of evidence at
summary judgment; a confidence analysis determines whether this
has occurred. Because a plaintiff has the burden of production on
almost all issues,233 viewing Matsushita as being decided under a
confidence analysis explains the conventional wisdom that
Matsushita helps defendants at the expense of plaintiffs.
231

There is a somewhat technical way to explain how Matsushita benefits
defendants at the expense of plaintiffs, even if Matsushita was decided under a
probability test. Summary judgment is appropriate against the plaintiff if even
one of the myriad facts that the plaintiff must prove in order to recovery is
unreasonable. On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate against the
defendant only if the jury would be unreasonable in finding for the defendant on
every fact needed for the plaintiff. The asymmetrical risks involved with
increased judicial fact-finding could explain why the standard in Matsushita is
perceived to help defendants at the expense of plaintiffs. That said, this
explanation seems less persuasive than the explanation offered in the text above,
which is that Matsushita helps defendants because it was decided pursuant to a
confidence analysis, which can only work against the party with the burden of
production.
232
See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 47 (2005) (describing the “gatekeeping” aspect of the
Matsushita decision); William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in
Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403 (2011) (“Matsushita expanded the
ability of defendants to obtain summary judgment by inviting lower courts to
scrutinize the economic plausibility of the plaintiff’s evidence of conspiracy.”)
(emphasis added).
233
See WRIGHT, supra note 52, at §5122 (explaining that the burden of
production is usually on the plaintiff).
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8. Twombly’s Plausibility Standard
There is one final factor that supports the confidence
understanding of Matsushita. Understanding Matsushita through a
confidence theory makes sense of the plausibility standard that the
Court introduced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.234 Most
commentators have rejected this “new” pleading standard under
the mistaken premise that the plausibility analysis requires judges
to determine the probability of disputed facts based only on the
pleadings.235 However, once one views Matsushita through a
confidence analysis, it is relatively easy to see the logic of the
progression from Matsushita to Twombly: if the plaintiff alleges
facts that, by themselves, are insufficient to satisfy the confidence
analysis to which they will be subjected at the summary judgment
stage, there is no reason to delay this legal conclusion past the
pleadings stage. This concept is explored in more depth in my
article Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s Plausibility
Standard, 236 but the relevancy to the current discussion is worth
noting. Once one interprets Matsushita under a confidence
analysis, clarity arises, not just with regard to Matsushita and
summary judgment but also with regard to the entire pre-trial
process under the Federal Rules (including the plausibility analysis
of Twombly).
VI.

CONCLUSION

The best reading of Matsushita, considering the multitude of
factors that one must considering in examining the case, is that it
was decided under a confidence analysis. If these factors are
analogized to a Rubik’s cube, a confidence reading of Matsushita
aligns almost all the sides of the cube.
A confidence reading of Matsushita cannot account for two
sides of this Rubik’s cube. One is the language in the Matsushita
opinion suggesting that the impetus for the Court’s decision was
234

See 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
See supra notes 28–29.
236
See Luke Meier, Comment, Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s
Plausibility Standard, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming).
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probability. As explained above, however, this language can be
discounted as a byproduct of the difficulty associated with
attempting to verbalize the elusive confidence concept. This task
was made even more difficult in Matsushita by the probative
weakness of the plaintiffs’ evidence. Moreover, a careful reading
of Matsushita and the Court’s previous decision in Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp suggests that— even if the Court meant
to speak in probability terms—it qualified this probability
language, which would make it dicta.
A confidence interpretation of Matsushita also cannot account
for the broad, historical significance assigned to the case. The
import of Matsushita, however, derives from the presumption that
it was decided according to a probability analysis. This premise is
incorrect. As such, the conclusion that Matsushita dramatically
reshaped summary judgment doctrine should be reconsidered.

